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PREFACE 
Positive accounting theory suggests that a firm's choices of 
. accounting policies are derived from contracting processes and their 
related costs. Accounting numbers are usually used in contracts, and 
managers of companies have the ability to obtain different accounting 
numbers using different accounting methods which are within accepted 
accounting principles. As a consequence, one can hypothesize that 
accounting method choices are affected by firms' contractual 
arrangements. Three kinds of c9ntracts between firms and others have 
been linked to accounting method choices: contracts between debtholders 
and management, owners and management, and management and political 
parties. As a result, three hypotheses have been suggested in the 
positive accounting literature to explain the differences among the 
accounting method choices: the debt hypothesis, the management 
compensation plan hypothesis, and the political cost hypothesis. 
Given the above hypotheses, researchers have tried to empirically 
test the positive accounting theory. Studies of accounting choice tests 
provide evidence that bonus, debt, and political process variables are 
statistically significant. The explanatory power of these models, 
however, has tended to be quite low, reducing the overall credibility of 
the empirical evidence. Consequently, positive accounting theory and 
the related literature have been the subject of criticism. Watts and 
Zimmerman [1990] claim that the lack of strong support (power-of-test) 
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can be explained by weaknesses in research methodology. Watts and 
Zimmerman call for three avenues of future research. One of these 
avenues is concerned with improving the power of the model used to test 
the theory. They note that improvement in specifying both dependent and 
explanatory variables, controlling for omitted variables, and 
appropriate model specification are critical for an increase in test 
power. 
This study addresses "power-of-test" issue as mentioned above. To 
test the effect of the improvement of the dependent variable measurement 
on the test power, a model of the dependent variable that is free of 
many of the criticisms is developed. The model not only separates the 
amount of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, but also allows 
the researcher to measure the manipulated part of the discretionary 
accruals. The tests results provide evidence that when the measurement 
of the dependent variable improves the degree of fit (stated as adjusted 
R2 ) improves. The sample for this study was randomly chosen from the 
general population of firms. Then, the sample was divided into large 
and small companies. The measurement of explanatory (independent) 
variables were improved, the lagged variables, and those variables that 
have theoretical justification for affecting the accounting method 
choices (however, were mostly ignored in previous studies of positive 
accounting theory) were included in the model (for example, the degree 
of financial distress measured as Z and ZETA® can be mentioned). This 
resulted in including 27 improved and new variables in addition to the 
traditional variables that were used previously for the test of positive 
accounting theory. 
Interestingly enough, the results of the study agrees with Watts 
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and Zimmerman's claims. First, the improvement in the measurement of 
explanatory variables and inclusion of new variables as explanatory 
variables result in the improvement of the power of test (R2), second, 
partitioning the data into large and small companies shows that managers 
of small and large companies have different motives in their accounting 
method choices. Managers of large companies consider compensation and 
political-power related variables as the main variables for their 
accounting method choices. However, the debt, manager-political power, 
and financial distress variables are those that have main effect in the 
choices of accounting policies for managers of small companies. The 
results also show that the R2 increases when interaction between and 
among explanatory variables are included. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Positive accounting theory suggests that a firm's choices of 
accounting policies are derived from contracting processes and their 
related costs. Accounting numbers are usually used in contracts, and 
managers of companies have the ability to obtain different accounting 
numbers using different accounting methods which are within accepted 
accounting principles. As a consequence, one can hypothesize that 
accounting method choices are affected by firms' contractual 
arrangements. Three kinds of contracts between firms and others have 
been linked to accounting method choices: contracts between debtholders 
and management, owners and management, and management and political 
parties. As a result, three hypotheses have been suggested in the 
positive accounting literature to explain the differences among the 
accounting method choices: the debt hypothesis, the management 
compensation plan hypothesis, and the political cost hypothesis. 
Given the above hypotheses, researchers have tried to empirically 
test the positive accounting theory of Watts and Zimmerman. Holthausen 
and Leftwich [1983] and Watts and Zimmerman [1986] have reviewed the 
related literature. Appendix A also presents a summary of some of these 
studies. Studies of accounting choice tests provide evidence that 
bonus, debt, and political process variables are statistically 
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significant. The explanatory power of these models, however, has tended 
to be quite low, reducing the overall credibility of the empirical 
evidence. 
Consequently, positive accounting theory and the related 
literature have been the subject of criticism. Watts and Zimmerman 
[1990] claim that the lack of strong support can be explained by 
weaknesses in research methodology. There are two major research 
issues: the lack of power of the tests and alternative explanations for 
the empirical regularities. Concerning these issues, Watts and 
Zimmerman [1990, p. 143] make the following observation: 
The research method issues are important and future 
research must attempt to address them. However, it is 
unlikely that the positive accounting literature. 
will ever totally eliminate such issues. 
In their concluding remarks, Watts and Zimmerman call for three 
avenues of future research. One of these avenues is concerned with 
improving the power of the model used to test the theory. They note 
that improvement in specifying both dependent and explanatory variables, 
controlling for omitted variables, and appropriate model specification 
are critical for an increase in test power. 
Watts and Zimmerman claim that the accounting choice variable (the 
dependent variable) has not yet been adequately specified. Net accruals 
is the most promising measure (since it reflects the relative effects on 
earnings of various accounting choices)--yet this measure includes a 
non-discretionary component, and is, therefore, a noisy measure of the 
amount of net accruals that can be manipulated by managers. Watts and 
Zimmerman [1990, p. 144] identify the following need (emphasis added): 
Ideally, net accruals should be measured relative to 
what they would be without manipulation, so these 
variations are excluded from the left-hand-side 
[dependent] variable. This requires a model of 
accruals that currently does not exist. 
Criticism of the explanatory variables also is relevant. For 
example, use of a zero-one variable to measure a bonus plan is 
simplistic. Further, firm size may be a totally inadequate measure of 
political sensitivity. Use of the debt-to-equity ratio may not capture 
the closeness to the debt covenant itself (Watts and Zimmerman [1990]). 
Models have also ignored the possible interaction effects of the 
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explanatory variables. Additionally, omitted variables can cause biased 
coefficients for the explanatory variables and hamper their 
interpretation. 
This study addresses these "power-of-test" issues and develops a 
model that is free of many of the criticisms. The study's proposed 
model for the dependent variable shows an improvement in the power-of-
test. Also, when the measurement of explanatory variables is improved 
and new explanatory variables are included in the model, the explanatory 
power (stated in degrees of fit--R2 ) shows a significant increase over 
that of prior research. So, the weak explanatory power found in 
previous studies can be attributed to research methods and not to a 
deficiency in the theory itself. The test results of the proposed 
model, therefore, represent a significant contribution to the accounting 
choice literature. 
The following chapter presents a review of the literature. 
Chapter Three examines the theory of accounting choice in further 
detail. Chapter Four describes how this study deals with these power-
of-test issues while outlining the methodology used to calculate the 
variables in the model. A description of the data selection is 
presented in Chapter Five, followed by the discussion of the test 
results in Chapter Six. The last chapter (seven) presents the summary, 
contributions and limitations of the study, and suggestions for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The "information perspective," the notion that the purpose of 
accounting data is to provide information to investors, creditors, and 
other interested persons, has been the subject of extensive studies. 
Ball and Brown [1968] and Beaver [1968] for example, showed that 
accounting data play an informational role in setting stock prices. As 
a result of early studies of the effect of accounting data on the market 
price of securities (like ones mentioned above), accounting research 
began to focus more on how accounting information is used and what kind 
of information is needed, given the decision-makers' utility functions 
and their decision-making models (e.g. Libby [1981]). 
The information perspective views accounting information as the 
input for valuation models. It suggests that accounting numbers supply 
information for investment decisions and assumes both that information 
is costless and that there are no transaction costs. Information that 
does not inform the market should be useless, and the degree to which 
the information does inform the market can be measured by the degree of 
market reaction to the release of that information. The "better" the 
input (the accounting information) is, the "better" the output (usually 
measured by the market's reaction to the release of the information). 
This information perspective further resulted in the adoption of 
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the "mechanistic" and the "no-effect" perspectives. The mechanistic 
perspective suggests that corporate managers change accounting 
procedures to inflate reported earnings and their corporation's stock 
price (Watts and Zimmerman [1986]). However, early tests of the market 
reaction to changes in accounting techniques (e.g. Ball [1972]) provide 
no evidence for an association between abnormal market returns and 
changes in accounting techniques unless a tax effect was associated with 
the change(s). Consequently, the mechanistic view of accounting choices 
was rejected (Watts and Zimmerman [1986]) and the "no-effect" theory was 
adopted. Under the "no-effect theory," changes in accounting numbers 
resulting from the changes in accounting methods per se do not affect 
the market. However, companies were changing their accounting 
procedures, and it appeared that no explanation existed for these 
changes and their choices of accounting methods. 
The failure of the information perspective to explain why 
companies were choosing certain accounting methods resulted in the 
introduction of another perspective, the "contracting perspective" that 
would presumably explain and predict accounting method choices. The 
contracting perspective considers a firm as a nexus of contracts. A 
firm, or the parties that constitute it, can have explicit and/or 
implicit contracts with several parties, such as stockholders, 
debtholders, management, employees, customers, government, politicians, 
and environmentalists. This perspective recognizes the information 
and/or transaction costs that were ignored in the tests of the 
information perspective. 
Accounting numbers may be used directly or indirectly in any of 
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these contracts. For example, it is well documented that accounting 
numbers are used in debt covenants. Also, very often labor unions have 
used these numbers to indicate that firms are able to improve workers' 
compensation packages. Thus, employees' compensation contracts are also 
affected by accounting numbers. Since the different accounting methods 
available for firms and their managers yield different accounting 
numbers, it is logical to conclude that the choices of accounting 
methods are biased toward firms' explicit and implicit contracts. 
Positive accounting- theory suggests that choices of accounting 
methods are driven by contracting variables. Usually, three sets of 
contracting variables are proposed for accounting-method decisions. The 
sets of variables, which can be both explicit and implicit, are related 
to managers' compensation, debt covenants, and political processes. 
Watts and Zimmerman [1986] hypothesized the following relationship 
between the accounting method choices and the above sets of variables: 
Bonus plan hypothesis. Managers of firms with bonus plans are more 
likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to the current period (p. 208). 
Debt/equity hypothesis. The larger a firm's debt/equity ratio, the 
more likely the firm's manager is to select accounting procedures 
that shift reported earnings from future periods to the current 
period (p. 216). 
Size hypothesis. The larger the firm, the more likely the manager 
is to choose accounting procedures that defer reported earnings 
from current to future periods (p. 235). 
The bonus plan hypothesis, debt/equity hypothesis, and size 
hypothesis are related to managers' compensation, debt covenants, and 
political processes, respectively. Given the above hypotheses, the 
studies of positive accounting theory have been designed either to 
explain and predict (in-use) accounting-methods (e.g., Hagerman and 
Zmijewski [1979]) or to find the effect on accounting-method choice of 
changes in the explanatory variables (e.g., change in bonus plan in 
Healy [1985]). To facilitate the review of the related literature, the 
following format has been chosen1 : 
1- Studies that explain in-use accounting methods. 
2- Studies that predict changes in accounting methods as a result of 
changes in contracting variables. 
2.1 Studies that explain in-use accounting methods 
The most frequently mentioned studies that explain in-use 
accounting methods are Hagerman and Zmijewski [1979] and Zmijewski and 
Hagerman [1981] (hereafter HZ and ZH respectively). HZ, using probit 
analysis, investigated the association between the choice of a single-
accounting method (the dependent variable) and the concentration ratio, 
profit sharing, risk, capital intensity, net sales, and total assets 
(explanatory variables). They chose four single-accounting methods 
(Depreciation, Inventory, Investment tax credit, and Pension costs 
amortization), resulting in four different models which shared the same 
explanatory variables (except in the inventory model, which also 
included effective tax rate) but different dependent variables. 
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Accounting methods for each model were divided into an income-increasing 
and an income-decreasing choice, and then a value of one or zero was 
1 A summary of some of these studies is presented in Appendix A. 
assigned to the dependent variable (with income increasing being equal 
to one). For example, for the depreciation model, the straight-line 
method (income increasing) resulted in a value of one, whereas the 
accelerating method (income decreasing) resulted in a value of zero for 
the dependent variable. 
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HZ found that the theory was able to explain some of the managers' 
choices of accounting methods (e.g., in the case of the depreciation 
method). All models predicted the choice of accounting methods better 
than did a model that randomly assigned firms to each method (at levels 
of .10, .OS, .10, and .10 for depreciation, inventory, investment tax 
credit, and pension costs amortization methods, respectively). The 
estimated R2s for depreciation, inventory, investment tax credit, and 
pension costs amortization models were .43, .23, .06, and .06 
respectively. HZ found that larger firms tend to use accounting 
procedures that reduce reported earnings, an indication that the size of 
a company has explanatory power for the choices of accounting methods. 
Although the results for the most part agreed with the theory, the 
study was criticized for not including any variables for_debt contracts. 
Also, HZ's models could not predict significantly better than would the 
strategy of predicting that all firms follow the most common method. 
For example, the depreciation method chosen by 255 out of the 300 firms 
(85 percent) was straight-line depreciation. If all firms were 
predicted to use straight line, 85.00 percent of the firms would be 
correctly predicted. HZ's model is correct 85.33 percent of the time 
(Watts and Zimmerman [1986] p. 270). The study also ignored the fact 
that managers' decisions relating to accounting methods could be based 
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on a portfolio of accounting methods and not just on a single method. 
ZH used the same sample as HZ to ·investigate firms' portfolios of 
four accounting procedures. The same accounting methods as HZ were 
employed to construct the dependent variable in the models (resulting in 
16 possible portfolios; four accounting methods, each having two 
different income effects: 24 - 16). They made three different 
assumptions about the magnitude of the effect of each method on firms' 
income: 
1- All four procedures have the same impact on reported earnings 
(resulting in five strategies for 16 portfolios). 
2- The pension cost and investment tax credit alternatives have 
exactly one-half of the effect of the inventory and depreciation 
alternatives (resulting in seven strategies for 16 portfolios). 
3- The effects of pension costs and tax credits are equal but less 
than one-half of the effect of inventory and deprecation 
alternatives on reported income (resulting in nine strategies for 
16 portfolios). · 
ZH also added two new variables (risk and debt-to-total assets) to 
the set of explanatory variables in HZ. The results of the probit 
analysis of accounting strategies indicated that all estimated 
coefficients had their predicted signs. ZH found that the size effect 
(measured· as total assets) is driven by large firms. Although results 
of the study supported positive accounting theory, the low explanatory 
power of the study (R2 for five-, seven-, and nine-strategy cases was 
.090, .090, and .089 respectively) and problems with the arbitrary 
measurement of the dependent variable necessitated further study of 
managers' accounting-method decisions. 
Press and Weintrop [1990] used a five-strategy methodology similar 
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to ZH's for calculating the value of the dependent variable. For the 
explanatory variables, however, Press and Weintrop changed the 
measurement of the debt-related variable in that they incorporated the 
leverage constraint obtained from SEC filings, annual reports, and 
Moody's Industrial Manuals. Also, they replaced ZH's "debt-to-total 
assets" explanatory variable with four different measurements. Results 
of their study (which is subject to small sample size criticism) show 
improvement in the R2 compared to that of ZH (e.g., .23 compared to 
.090). The degree of fit (R2 ) is further increased when the constraints 
defined in the debt covenants are included (to a maximum of .30 in Table 
10, Case 4, p. 90). Their results suggest that the power of positive 
accounting theory in explaining accounting method choices increases when 
the measurement of the explanatory variable is improved. 
The following section presents studies which examined a specific 
set of companies sharing a particular situation. These studies predict 
an income-increasing or decreasing change in accounting methods as a 
result of the change(s) in contracting variables. 
2.2 Studies that predict changes in accounting methods 
as a result of changes in contracting variables 
If the choice of accounting policies results from conditions 
relating to contracting variables, then it is logical that material 
changes in the contracting variables should cause a follow-up change in 
the accounting policies. The direction of the change in the accounting 
policies (income-increasing or income-decreasing) depends on the 
direction of the change(s) in the contracting variables. For example, 
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if the debt-to-equity ratio (as surrogate for debt covenants) increases, 
according to the debt/equity hypothesis, the researcher looks for 
changes in accounting policies that result in an increase in the amount 
of earnings. The studies in this category do not usually construct a 
model for choices of accounting methods. As a result, they do not 
usually include any particular dependent variable (except the condition 
which is shared among the companies). Since the prediction of the 
choices is only "income-increasing" or "income-decreasing" behavior in a 
particular situation, the results of these studies are not easily 
generalizable outside a specific set of conditions. 
Usually three sets of changes and/or differences in independent 
variables have interested researchers: changes in the managers' 
compensation or their interests (e.g., their job), changes in the 
political environment, and changes in debt and debt covenants. An 
example for the first set is Healy [1985]. Healy partitioned the data 
according to the details of the management compensation plan and found 
that choices of accounting procedures corresponded to the maximization 
of the present value of the management compensation. His study reveals 
that when the upper and lower limits in the managers' compensation bonus 
plans change, managers choose a set of accounting methods that will 
increase their compensation. 
Healy used Proxy statements to find the upper and lower boundaries 
of bonus plans. Then, he divided each company-year into three 
portfolios. Since the upper and lower limits of managers' compensation 
plans might be different from one year to another, one company could be 
assigned to different portfolios in different years (hence the term 
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company-year). The portfolios were UPP, LOW, and MID. Portfolio UPP 
comprised those company-year observations for which the bonus contract 
upper limit was binding and the cash flow from operations exceeded the 
upper bound defined in the bonus plan. Portfolio LOW comprised 
observations for which the bonus plan's lower bound was binding. 
Company-years were assigned to this portfolio if earnings were less than 
the lower bound specified in the bonus plan. Portfolio MID contained 
observations where neither the upper nor lower bound was binding (pp. 95 
and 96). 
Healy used the value of accruals 2 for each company-year and 
tested for statistically significant differences among the means of the 
accruals for the three portfolios. His results demonstrated a strong 
association between the amount of accruals and the upper and lower 
limits of managers' compensation bonus plans. He further studied the 
association between accrual subcomponents (e.g., change in inventory) 
and bonus plan parameters. Again, his results confirmed the bonus plan 
hypothesis. 
Among those studies that test positive accounting theory in 
different political environments are Liberty and Zimmerman [1986] and 
DeAngelo [1988). Liberty and Zimmerman looked for an association 
between reduced reported earnings and labor union contract negotiations. 
Theoretically, during a labor union contract negotiation, lower earnings 
indicates that firms are unable (or less able) to increase labor 
2 Healy calculated the amount of accruals by totaling depreciation 
expense, extraordinary items, change in accounts receivable, change in 
inventory, change in accounts payable, change in taxes payable, and 
deferred income tax expense. The amount was further adjusted for bonus 
plan earnings definitions. -
compensation packages. Liberty and Zimmerman used a random-walk model 
to predict the expected amount of earnings, and the difference between 
the expected and actual earnings was assumed to be the amount of 
manipulation in income. The results of the study, however, did not 
indicate that managers chose income-decreasing accounting methods when 
labor union contract negotiations were in progress. 
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DeAngelo [1988] examined a political environment in which 
stockholders who disagree with managerial policies seek election to the 
firm's board of directors (proxy contests). She hypothesized that 
incumbent managers exercise their accounting discretion to portray a 
favorable picture of their own performance to voting stockholders. To 
test this hypothesis, she used a random walk model to find the 
unexpected amount of accruals for the period in the study. The expected 
amount of accruals was calculated by subtracting operating cash flow 
from the amount of net income in the period prior to the proxy contests. 
Then, the unexpected (abnormal) amount of accruals was estimated by 
taking the difference between the expected and actual amounts of 
accruals. Results of DeAngelo's study confirmed her hypothesis. Also, 
the results showed that new managers who have won their way in a proxy 
contest take a "bath" to decrease earnings and blame ·the decreases on 
the previous management. 
Although DeAngelo improved the measurement of the dependent 
variable by considering only unexpected accruals (as opposed to the 
unexpected amount of earnings in Liberty and Zimmerman [1986]), she was 
unable to separate the discretionary and non-discretionary parts of 
accruals. It is appropriate to judge the manipulation of the accounting 
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numbers by analyzing the unexpected amount of the discretionary part of 
accruals, but not-the unexpected amount of total accruals (which also 
includes the non-discretionary component). 
The relationship between the choice of accounting methods and debt 
covenants has also been the subject of extensive studies (e.g. Daley and 
Vigeland [1983], and Healy and Palepu [1990]). Daley and Vigeland 
[1983] investigated the choice between capitalization and expensing for 
research and development (R&D) costs prior to 1974. Their investigation 
showed an association between the R&D accounting method and size (as a 
proxy for the political cost), degree of leverage, and dividend 
restrictions. Since their methodology compared two different groups of 
firms (those who adopted R&D capitalization and those who did not), they 
did not produce an expected amount for the amount of accruals or 
earnings. Results of their study indicated that smaller firms 
capitalized the R&D costs relatively more often than larger firms, which 
resulted in higher net income for the smaller firms during periods of 
capitalization. Their results also revealed that firms who chose to 
capitalize R&D costs were more highly leveraged, used more public debt, 
and were closer to dividend restrictions. 
Healy and Palepu [1990] compared the firms' accounting and 
dividend responses to an increase in the tightness of dividend 
constraints. They hypothesized that firms that were subject to dividend 
restrictions would, to circumvent the covenants, choose accounting 
methods that resulted in a higher net income. To test the hypothesis, 
they used changes in single-accounting method choices to find the 
possible association between the changes in accounting policies and the 
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dividend restrictions. Their results showed that firms cut dividends 
and do not appear to make accounting changes to bypass the restrictions. 
The results suggested that accounting-based covenants are effective 
means by which bondholders can restrict firms' dividend policies (p. 
97). Although Healy and Palepu's [1990] results conflict with other 
studies (see Christie [1990] for a review of relevant studies), they 
provide no sufficient explanations for the differences. This study is 
subject to other criticism, too. For example, in testing their 
hypothesis, the authors fail to consider the total discretionary amount 
of accruals. Also, they considered only a restricted environment, as did 
other studies in this category, which limits the generalizeability of 
results. All of the above studies (in both sections 2.1 and 2.2) have 
been the subject of extensive criticism. Using the-results of previous 
studies, Christie [1990] showed that the following six variables have 
significant explanatory power in managers' accounting-method decisions: 
managerial compensation, leverage, size, risk, interest coverage, and 
dividend constraints. Consequently, excluding any of these variables 
from models constructed for a test of positive accounting theory may 
produce erroneous results. Also, as discussed in the following section, 
the measurement of some of the variables in these models is 
questionable. This is of particular importance in evaluating the 
empirical evidence for positive accounting theory, since the lack of 
power (R2 ) can be blamed on difficulties in specifying and measuring 
dependent and explanatory variables. 
The following section discusses in more detail the criticism of 
studies related to positive accounting theory. The criticisms are 
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limited to those that this study addresses. 
2.3 A review of the methodology criticism 
The following research methodology points have been the focus of 
criticism in discussions of previous empirical tests of positive 
accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman [1990]): 
a) Dependent (left-hand-side) variable problems 
b) Sample selection problems 
c) Explanatory (right-hand-side) variables problems 
d) Model mis-specification problems 
e) Omitted variables problems 
2.3.1 Dependent Cleft-hand-side) variable problems 
The problems with the left-hand-side (dependent) variable have 
resulted from the assumptions used in specifying it (Watts and Zimmerman 
[1990]). For example, some researchers test the changes in a single-
method choice, assuming that other method choices are constant (e.g., 
Hagerman and Zmijewski [1979]). In other words, these researchers 
assume that changes in a single accounting method can be separated from 
other method choices for the purpose of their study. However, companies 
actually use a combination of accounting method choices, rather than a 
single method (e.g., Zmijewski and Hagerman [1981]). 
Another questionable assumption could be reflected in the way in 
which the effects of accounting choices have been measured. Some 
studies assume that choices of different accounting methods have a 
similar income effect. For example, Zmijewski and Hagerman [1981] and 
Press and Weintrop [1990] assume that both income-decreasing choices of 
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inventory method (e.g., LIFO) and depreciation method (e.g., 
accelerated) reduce income equally. If this assumption is not correct 
(and it likely is not), then the model for the test of accounting-
method-choice will not properly explain the methods chosen by companies 
simply because the value of the dependent variable is mis-specified. 
Figures 2-1 and 2-2 depict these situations. 
{
0 it the method is income decreasing 
yl = 
1 it the method is income increasing 
Figure 2-1: Single method choice tests 
yi = profile of firm i 
~Mj = 0 iC the method is income decreasing Y1 =EMj 
~ = 1 iC the method is income inae:asiog 
Figure 2-2: Multiple methods choice tests 
19 
Using accruals, however, may resolve the difficulties with single 
and multiple methods choice tests. For example, the tota~ effect of the 
choices of accounting methods is captured in accruals and no specific 
assumption is necessary to calculate the value of the dependent 
variable. Figure 2-3 represents a situation in which the unexpected 
amount of accruals is used as the left-hand-side variable3 . 
3 Hereafter, accruals stands for both "deferrals" and "accruals." 
"Deferrals" refers to the revenues (expenses) for which ·recognition is 
deferred to future period(s) although the cash transactions (receipts or 
payments) have occurred. "Accruals" refers to the revenues (expenses) 
that are being recognized although no cash has been received (paid). 
y 
________ ,.... 
Nit - crt = ~ = Yi 
E(~) = ~-1 
Yi = unexpected accrnal = E(~) • At,1 
Figure 2-3: Accruals test: Total unexpected amount 
of accruals for the period 
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Unfortunately, when the amount of accruals is· considered, another 
problem surfaces. Managers do not necessarily have discretion over the 
total amount of the accruals. In other words, the amount of accruals 
has two different components: one over which a manager has discretion, 
and one over which a manager cannot exercise any discretion. Including 
the non-discretionary component produces an erroneous value for the 
dependent variable and decreases the power of the test. This problem is 
addressed in this study. The model constructed in Section 4.1 is able 
to detect the manipulated amount of accruals (hereafter MAC). 
2.3.2 Sample selection problems 
Studies mentioned in Section 2.2 have a similar problem: their 
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results came from a set of companies that shared a (set) of specific 
condition(s). As a consequence, the results of those studies are not 
easily generalizable to companies who do not share these condition(s). 
So, these studies do not result in a comprehensive test of the theory 
(limited sample problem). On the other hand, studies reviewed in 
Section 2.1 are not able to explain the choices of accounting 
procedures, since either the R2 is very low or the research designs have 
been the subject of significant criticism. 
One of the problems with most studies of positive accounting 
theory is that they ignore possible differences between small and large 
firms. Previous studies suggest that small firms choose different 
accounting policies from large firms mainly because of the difference in 
size (e.g., Daley and Vigeland [1983) showed that smaller firms 
capitalized R&D costs more often than larger firms). Ignoring this 
difference and combining small and large firms to test the theory can 
result in lower R2s and erroneous models for the accounting-method 
choices. 
The research design of this study avoids the above problems in two 
ways. First, it links the sets of studies mentioned previously 
(Sections 2.1 and 2.2). No study, yet, has investigated the 
relationship between the change in the amount of discretionary accruals 
(dependent variable)--in a sample drawn from the general population--and 
change(s) in the independent variables (as defined by positive 
accounting theory). In addition, the sample in this study has been 
partitioned into large and small companies, thus avoiding the problem of 
ignoring differences between the two groups. 
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2.3.3 Explanatory (right-hand-side) variables problems 
The problems related to right-hand-side variables are mostly those 
of measurement difficulties. For example, using a dummy variable for the 
bonus plan assumes that the model can capture the effects of the 
components of the bonus plans. However, Healy [1985] shows that the 
components of the bonus plans have a stronger explanatory power than 
merely the presence of the bonus plans. Also, the use of size as a 
proxy for the political cost may not capture the full effect of 
political activity. Some studies even use the size as an independent 
hypothesis--size hypothesis--to avoid problems in the interpretation of 
the results found for the size variable (e.g., Christie [1990] and Watts 
and Zimmerman [1986]). A more direct measure of political sensitivity 
is needed. Finally, the debt-to-equity variable may not reflect the 
closeness to the debt covenant that may actually induce a manager to 
select income-increasing methods. 
This study avoids the above problems by improving the measurement 
of explanatory variables. In addition, some new explanatory variables 
were included--as will be discussed in Section 2.3.5 below. For 
example, the lower limit values of the management compensation plans are 
included in the models in this study (Section 4.2.2). Also, a direct 
measurement of the political environment effect has been used (Section 
4.2.3). For the debt covenant variable, not only is the lag of the 
variable in previous periods included in the model, but the relationship 
of the firm's debt to that of related industries is also explored. 
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2.3.4 Model mis-specification problems 
Two model mis-specifications have been mentioned in positive 
accounting research. The first one deals with the underlying assumption 
~egarding managers' choices of accounting methods: they choose the 
methods because of opportunistic and/or efficiency motives. Researchers 
have tested the theory assuming a constant investment opportunity set 
and constant contracts. If choices of accounting procedures depend on 
firms' opportunity sets and contracts in addition to the managers' 
opportunistic behavior (for example), then the model is rnis-specified. 
Another model mis-specification originates from possible interactions 
among the explanatory variables. Almost all studies have treated the 
right-hand-side variables as additive and ignored the possible 
interactions (Watts and Zimmerman [1990]). 
Another inherent assumption in previous tests of positive 
accounting theory is that the choice of accounting methods results from 
the contracting variables that were present when the accounting methods 
were chosen, ignoring the possibility that a manager's decision may be 
based on a combination of present and past contracting conditions. For 
example, Zmijewski and Hagerman [1981] use the debt-to-equity ratio (as 
an explanatory variable) only for the year that the accounting methods 
are being studied. If the manager's decision is partially based on the 
trend of the ratio during the last several years, then the model is mis-
specified because the relevant variables are not included in it. 
To avoid the above problems, the interactions between and among 
some of the independent variables are included in this study. Also, the 
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lag values of the explanatory variables are included in the models. 
2.3.5 Omitted variables problems 
As implied, the problems mentioned in the two previous sections 
could result in missing variables. The following are some of the 
variables that have been ignored, or not controlled for, in previous 
research: 
1) Accepted set of accounting methods 
2) Implicit set of contracts 
3) Firms' financial distress 
4) Corporate and labor market control 
5) Stock option plans 
6) Firms' subjection to take-over efforts 
7) Other long-term compensatory plans 
For example, "the accepted set of accounting methods" is important 
when accounting method choices are studied across companies. A manager 
of a company has only a limited set of accounting methods from which to 
select and which is not necessarily identical to that of another company 
(Watts and Zimmerman [1990]). Obviously, the manager may choose a 
.different set of accounting methods if he has different available 
choices. 
The implicit set of contracts can also be considered to provide 
incentives for management's accounting choices. These implicit claims 
are unwritten agreements between the firm and "stakeholders" (e.g. 
customers and employees) and include promises such as continuing service 
to customers and job security for employees. Bowen, DuCharme, and 
Shores [1990] provide support for the above statement. 
It has also been shown that firms who face financial problems, 
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e.g., bankruptcy, choose income-increasing accounting methods. Schwartz 
[1982] shows that a financially distressed group of firms, when compared 
to a financially healthy group of firms, chose more income-increasing 
accounting methods (p. 41). He suggests that firms do so to improve 
their financial appearance. Consequently, one of the variables that can 
have explanatory power for choices of accounting methods may be the 
firm's degree of financial distress. 
Eliminating these variables results in lower explanatory power in 
the tests of the theory, a situation which could be avoided by either 
introducing these variables into the models or controlling for them. To 
address the problems related to omitted variables, this study 
incorporates some of the mentioned variables into the model. Section 
4.2.4 discusses the variables that are included for the test of theory 
in this study. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTING CHOICES 
Using utility maximization of owner and manager (principal and 
agent), Jensen and Meckling [1976] prove that managers (when they do not 
own the firm's total shares) make sub-optimal decisions. These 
decisions result in a reduction of the firm's value which could have 
been avoided if the manager owned the firm completely. Jensen and 
Meckling [1976] add another dimension to their analysis when they 
include the effect of debt on the manager's decision-making behavior. 
Given a set of assumptions, they prove that managers make sub-optimal 
decisions to transfer risk from themselves and principals (shareholders) 
to debtholders. This agency problem originates from the fact that the 
agent does not have the same incentives as the stockholders to maximize 
the firms' value. 
If the managers were able to benefit from the firm's total output, 
they would perform their best and would avoid sub-optimal decisions. 
Three sources of agency problems are mentioned: informational asymmetry, 
the existence of debt financing under limited liability, and partial 
ownership of the firm by an owner/manager (Barnea et al. [1985], p. 
596). Asymmetry of information among individuals is known as the source 
of the moral hazard problem. A practical way to solve this problem is 
to invest resources into monitoring actions and to use this information 
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in the contracts. Accounting is one of many monitoring systems that may 
serve to reduce agency problems (e.g., Barnea et. al. [1981] and 
Holmstrom [1979]). As Smith and Warner [1979] mention, covenants used 
for restricting dividends, financing, and production/investment policy 
are frequently specified in terms of income or balance sheet numbers 
(this is also true in compensation contracts between the firm and its 
management). Since there are usually no restrictions on the computation 
of the accounting numbers except to be consistent with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), management can manipulate the 
accounting numbers which define the constraints contained in the 
contracts (Smith and Warner [1979], p. 202). 
Managers can manipulate accounting numbers to different degrees 
and because of opposing incentives. For example, for some debt 
covenants, the higher the amount of net income, the more easily the firm 
can avoid the pressures resulting from the covenant conditions, while 
for other contracts (e.g., labor contracts) the opposite may be true. 
So, different sets of accounting methods may be suitable, depending on 
the kind of contract. For the sake of clarity in this discussion, 
parties that could have implicit or explicit contracts with a firm (and, 
as a result may influence choices of accounting methods) and the effect 
of the simultaneous presence of several contracting parties are 
addressed separately. The contracting parties are discussed in the 
following order: 
1) Management 
2) Debtholders 
3) Political parties (e.g. government agencies, labor unions, and 
environmentalists) 
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4) Others (e.g. customers and employees) 
5) The simultaneous presence of different contracting parties 
3.1 Management 
Agency theory suggests that managers (agents) of firms, in an 
effort to maximize their expected utility, make sub-optimal investment 
strategy decisions (Jensen and Meckling [1976]). For example, if a 
manager is compensated by a fixed amount of money, and is not sharing 
the firm's output, then there is no incentive for him to maximize the 
firm's market value or output. For this reason, management compensation 
is often calculated in a way that allows managers to share in the firms' 
output. In many compensation plans, accounting income is used as the 
contracting variable (Healy [1985]). 
It is logical to assume that if the compensation of managers 
depends on accounting income, then they have incentives to choose 
income-increasing accounting methods in an effort to increase the level 
of their current compensation (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman [1986]). 
Moreover, management compensation is likely to be implicitly linked to 
firm performance as this is reflected in accounting numbers, even if the 
compensation contracts are not explicitly tied to reported accounting 
numbers (e.g. Ayers [1986]). It is expected that managers' incentives 
for choices of income-increasing accounting methods will be higher when 
their total compensation for one period is relatively lower than for 
other periods (all else being equal). Therefore, changes in the 
managers' total compensation from one year to another may also provide 
different degrees of incentive for choosing particular accounting 
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procedures. 
In general, the "managers of firms with bonus plans are more 
likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from 
future periods to the current period" (Watts and Zimmerman [1986] 
p.208). However, since Healy [1985] showed that the degree of the 
shift is related to the terms contained in the bonus plans and the 
manager's revenue in each period, bonus terms are important and should 
be incorporated in the definition of a bonus variable. 
3.2 Debtholders 
It is intuitively reasonable that investments with relatively 
lower risk have a higher market value than other investments (ceteris 
paribus). Consequently, any decrease in the risk involved in 
investments should be followed by a positive market reaction. Using 
this notion, Jensen and Meckling [1976] demonstrate that managers try to 
decrease the investment risk of shareholders by increasing the 
investment risk of debtholders. If managers are successful in 
transfering part of the risk from the stockholders to the debtholders, 
then the value of the stock will increase. 
Rational debtholders, of course, will either adjust the value of 
the purchased debt or impose restrictions upon management actions to 
avoid the risk transfer because they are aware of the manager's ability 
to transfer risk. Results of several studies on debt covenants show 
that the degree of the restriction on management's actions increases 
with the degree of leverage (e.g. Smith and Warner (1979], and Daley and 
Vigeland [1983]). 
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The restriction on management's actions, in most cases, is 
monitored by way of accounting figures--mostly earnings--that are 
calculated using the FASB/SEC guidelines (Smith and Warner [1979] and 
Duke and Hunt [1990]). Since the FASB allows companies to choose their 
accounting methods from a set of accepted procedures and a default on a 
debt contract is costly, it is argued that managers choose accounting 
methods that increase assets and revenues and decrease liabilities and 
expenses (Duke and Hunt [1990] p. 47). Or, the higher the degree of 
leverage, the more managers will try to choose income-increasing 
accounting methods (ceteris paribus) in an effort to avoid the 
consequences of debt-covenant defaults. 
Generally, two reasons are suggested for the above income-
increasing behavior. First, stockholders (the party that compensates 
the manager) reimburse, by increasing the manager's future compensation, 
those actions that will increase the value of their investment. Second, 
the manager may reduce his risk of debt covenant violations by choosing 
accounting methods that result in a decrease in the probability of 
defaults in debt covenants. 
Thus, it appears tenable that a direct relationship exists between 
the degree of leverage and the choice of income-increasing accounting 
methods. In general, managers of firms with a higher degree of leverage 
are more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported 
earnings from future periods to the current period. 
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3.3 Political parties 
A firm is not an isolated unit in society. Either it must 
interact with other political units (as in the case of governmental 
subsidies) or it is subject to the interactive needs of political 
parties (as in the case of labor union disputes). The interaction 
between the firm and political parties logically results in explicit or 
implicit negotiation processes. In any negotiation process, the parties 
involved try to maximize the present value of their wealth. If the 
maximization of the wealth for one party results in a cost (reduction in 
the wealth) to another party, then a conflict of interest arises. In 
the case of labor unions, this is obvious. Firms try to avoid increases 
in labor compensation while the unions negotiate for such increases. 
Political parties include the government, labor unions, 
environmentalists, and other companies. The government has an interest 
in firms because it is supposed to act on behalf of society as a whole. 
For example, Congress can pass laws that regulate companies, as it did 
in establishing the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934. The 
SEC has the legal authority to prescribe accounting principles and 
procedures for companies under its jurisdiction and to prescribe the 
form and content of financial reports filed with it. The labor union is 
one of the most powerful political parties. Unions represent the 
employees of corporations and use regulatory means (e.g. the court 
system) to acquire more benefits, as seen in the conflict between the 
airlines and the unions who represent the pilots. 
Accounting numbers can be used in at least two ways in negotiation 
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processes: first, as signals to the political parties that there are 
reasons for those parties to start negotiations with the firm, and 
second, as means in the negotiation process itself. In the first case, 
managers of firms are able to send positive or negative signals to 
outsiders by using different accounting procedures. Also, if managers 
are anticipating future negotiations between the firm and political 
parties, they can adopt an appropriate set of accounting methods for the 
expected situations. 
Variability in accounting earnings is a signal for political 
parties. Hagerman and Zmijewski [1979] suggest that a higher 
variability in returns may signal that firms from time to time earn 
abnormal returns, which may subject them to political costs. Since 
returns are highly correlated with the accounting earnings, firms may 
(in an attempt to reduce political pressures) try to reduce the 
variability in accounting earnings. Consequently, Hagerman and 
Zmijewski [1979] hypothesize that higher risk firms "choose income 
deflating alternatives" (p. 143). 
Accounting earnings signals for larger firms and those with 
relatively greater monopoly power have comparatively more weight, since 
these firms are more closely examined by the political parties. As a 
result, managers of these firms may have more incentive to avoid 
undesirable (sizable earnings) signals. Thus, firm size and the degree 
of monopoly power may affect accounting methods choices. 
Positive accounting theory assumes that managers choose income-
decreasing methods to avoid political costs (e.g. Christie [1990]). 
Relatively substantial accounting earnings may reveal the ability of the 
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firm to pay more wages and may also signal the possibility that the firm 
has a monopoly in the market; consequently, it is logical to expect that 
the pressure of political parties can affect the choice of accounting 
procedures. 
3.4 Others (e.g. customers and employees) 
A set of contracts that has not been closely studied in the 
existing positive accounting literature is the implicit ·set of contracts 
between a firm and its customers, employees, suppliers, and. so on. For 
example, Macaulay [1963] provides evidence, based on interviews and 
reviews of court cases, that many firms rely on implicit agreements in 
business decisions (quoted in Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores [1990]). A 
firm implicitly promises that it will continue to service customers, 
provide jobs for its employees, and offer business to its suppliers. 
Those who enter into implicit agreements assess the probability 
that a firm will default on its initial promises. On the other hand, 
implicit contracts have little legal standing should the default occur; 
they are enforced by the market mechanism imposing concessions on the 
firm with respect to the price of future implicit claims: for example, 
through lower prices to customers, higher prices to suppliers, and/or 
higher wages to employees (Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores [1990] p.2, and 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian [1978]). Thus a firm's value depends in 
part on the expected cost of concessions (imposed by parties like 
customers) relating to implicit contracts. 
Many of these parties have limited incentive to become well 
informed about a firm's reputation or financial position as it is 
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reflected in the market and is known to others (for example, 
stockholders). Consequently, it is argued that these parties may rely 
on accounting numbers as a low-cost monitoring device to assess the 
probability of default on implicit contracts. The higher the assessed 
probability, the more costly it will be for the firm. If a set of 
accounting methods results in a lower "assessed probability of default," 
then the manager has an incentive to choose that set of methods, in an 
attempt to maximize the market value of his firm. A low amount of 
accounting income may lead the assessors to feel that the company is in 
trouble and assign it a high probability for default. As a result, it 
is suggested that implicit contracts stimulate managers to choose 
income-increasing accounting procedures (Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 
[1990]). 
3.5 The simultaneous presence of different 
contracting parties 
Undoubtedly, a firm is involved with more than one contracting 
party at any point in time. If these contracts motivate the managers 
differently in their choice of accounting methods, then the simultaneous 
presence of contracts will result in an interactively-derived set of 
accounting procedures. For example, higher earnings impose political 
costs, so managers are motivated to select more income-decreasing 
accounting methods. At the same time, however, lower earnings may 
decrease a manager's bonus compensation. As a result, two different and 
opposite motives may drive managers in their accounting-method 
decisions. A manager's choice can be different depending on the 
magnitude of each motive. Ignoring the interactive effect in the 
descriptive models for accounting method choices limits the ability of 
the models to explain choices of accounting methods among companies. 
The direction of interactions between/among variables can be 
predicted only if variables involved in the interaction have the same 
predicted direction for the choice of accounting methods (income-
increasing or -decreasing). For example, the following directions for 
the bonus plan variable can be predicted: 
a) Income-increasing behavior for the interaction of the 
debt variable and bonus plan variable when the income 
is higher than the lower boundary but lower than the 
upper boundary of the bonus plans. 
b) Income-decreasing behavior for the interaction of the 
political cost variable and the bonus plan variable 
when income is very much lower than the lower boundary 
of the bonus plan. 
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However, the direction of the interaction between the debt and the 
political cost variables depends on their relative importance in any 
firm and cannot be predicted. This, of course, does not mean that the 
interaction of these variables does not have explanatory power and 
should not be included in the models. A summary of the predicted 
effects of contracting parties on accounting numbers is shown in Table 
3-1 below4 . A more comprehensive discussion of the individual 
variables and their predicted and observed signs is also presented in 
Tables 6-7 and 6-8. 
4 Since the net amount of accruals reduces the net income for the 
period, predicted effects of contracting parties on accounting-method 
choices for net income and accruals are opposite. 
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TABLE 3-1 
THE PREDICTED EFFECTS OF CONTRACTING VARIABLES ON A FIRM'S 
INCOME AND THE AMOUNT OF ACCRUALS 
PREDICTED EFFECT OF THE PREDICTED EFFECT OF THE 
ACCOUNTING-METHOD ACCOUNTING-METHOD 
CONTRACTING PARTY/EXPLANATORY VARIABLE CHOICES ON THE CHOICES ON THE 
INCOME( I) ACCRUALs< 1) 
Management compensation Increasing Decreasing 
Debtholders Increasing Decreasing 
Political parties like government, labor unions, Decreasing Increasing 
.. 
environmentalists 
Customers and suppliers< 2 ) Increasing Decreasing 
Included missing variables: Firms' financial 
distress and firms' subjection to take-over Increasing Decreasing 
efforts 
(1) The predicted signs are typical signs for the explanatory variables. The expected signs in 
the models, however, depend on how the explanatory variables are measured. For example, it 
is expected that the management compensation explanatory variable is directly related to 
the income-increasing accounting choices. However, when the upper and lower boundaries of 
management compensation plans are included in the model, the expected sign depends on the 
distance of these variables from the net income (before manipulation). Section 4.2.2 
discusses this issue in more detail. 
(2) Since no operational means exists to measure the implicit contracts between the firm and 
its customers and suppliers, these contracting parties are not included in the models of 
this study. However, including a proxy variable (financial distress) may capture the 
effect of implicit contracts on the choices of accounting policies. See Section 4.2.4 for 
further explanation. 
Employing the above information, the following hypothesis is 
suggested to test the positive accounting theory: 
Ha: The contracting parties do not affect managers~ choices of 
accounting methods5 . 
The methodology used in this paper to measure the dependent and 
explanatory variables is discussed in the following chapter. 
5 The (explanatory) variables related to the contracting parties 
are discussed in Chapter Five. Section 5.3 presents the operational 
version of the above hypothesis. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design of this study is discussed in the following 
sections: 
1) Calculation of the dependent variable 
2) Definition of explanatory (independent) variables 
2.1) The debt covenant variable 
2.2) The management compensation variable 
2.3) The political variable 
2.4) The omitted variables 
2.5) The interaction between and among variables 
3) Test of the theory 
4.1 Calculation of the dependent variable 
Managers may sometimes adopt income-manipulation techniques that 
are less subject to detection by researchers (and outsiders in general). 
For example, changes in bad debt expense estimations cannot be detected 
by outsiders as easily as changes in the depreciation methods. DeAngelo 
[1986 and 1988] used the amount of accruals to reveal these subtle 
techniques because the effects of such changes will appear in net 
accruals. However, her model did not separate the discretionary (part 
that can be manipulated by the manager) and non-discretionary (part that 
can not be manipulated by the manager) components of accruals. 
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Therefore, a model of accruals that reflects the effects of income 
manipulation is developed within a three-period world, as below. This 
model segregates the discretionary and non-discretionary elements of 
accruals: 
t-1 
Base period 
t 
test period 
t+l 
end period 
Period t is the period for which discretionary accruals will be 
measured. The following assumptions are used in the development of the 
accrual model: 
1) The only significant manipulation of revenues is revenue 
deferral. 
2) Accrued expenses can be categorized as variable and fixed 
(where the activity measure is sales revenue). 
3) The only significant fixed accruals are depreciation and 
amortization. 
4) If revenues are deferred, they are deferred from the end 
of one period to the beginning of a subsequent period 
and are collected (or written off) by the end of the 
subsequent period. · 
5) If manipulated accrued expenses have an income-increasing 
(decreasing) effect in the test period, so will the 
deferred revenue. 
6) The ratio of "true" accounts receivable to "true" sales 
revenue is constant over the three periods. "True" 
means the amount that would be reported without 
discretionary changes. 
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7) Any significant change in fixed accruals and the income 
effect are disclosed in the financial statements (APB 
Opinion No. 20 is effective6). 
The above assumptions are sufficient to allow the calculation of 
the discretionary component of net accruals (At). This component is the 
sum of three sub-components: 
the fixed accrual effect 
the variable accrual effect 
the revenue deferral effect 
By assumptions two, three, and seven, Aft can be directly 
assessed. Only manipulative change will be assigned, e.g., an increase 
in depreciation because of asset acquisition will not count. The 
variable effect is obtained by the following calculation. Let Evt 
Eat - Fat for all t, where 
Evt variable accrued expenses 
Eat total accrued expenses 
Fat fixed accrued expenses 
Next we can calculate the variable cost ratio for accrued expenses 
in periods t-1 and t: 
where Rt-l and Rt are reported revenues for the two periods. 
6 In practice, firms are required to follow the APB Opinion No. 20. 
Results of data collection confirmed this assumption. 
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The change in the variable cost ratio, 4V = Vt-l - Vt, reflects the 
manipulation of variable accrued expenses that occurred in period t. If 
4V is positive (negative) then the manipulation is income-increasing 
(decreasing). The calculation of the dollar effect, Avt• will be 
addressed with revenue deferral. 
The revenue deferral effect is calculated using assumptions one, 
four, five, and six. If the accrued expenses reflect income-increasing 
behavior, then revenue is being deferred from period t-1 to period t (by 
assumption five). By assumption four, the ending Accounts Receivable 
balance is correctly specified for period t. Because of assumption five 
and the three-period world, the revenues and accounts receivable in 
period t+l are correctly reported. Thus, ARt+d~+1 - Kt+l - K by 
assumption six. Using the receivables factor, K, the "true" revenues of 
period t can be computed7 : 
The deferral effect on income, therefore, is computed as follows: 
where: b is the total variable cost ratio. Total variable cost 
consists of variable cash and variable accrued expenses. 
Finally, the dollar value of the variable effect is computed as follows: 
7 If income decreasing actions are signaled, then K is computed in 
period t-1 and the manipulated amount of revenue is calculated at period 
t+l for period t. 
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An example illustrating this model is contained in Appendix B. 
4.2 Definition of explanatory 
(independent) variables 
Chapter Three of this study presented the theoretical 
justification for the explanatory variables which influence the choices 
of accounting procedures. The explanatory variables that are considered 
in this study are: 
1) The debt covenant variable 
2) The management compensation variable 
3) The political variable 
4) The omitted variables 
5) The interaction between and among these independent variables 
The approach to calculating these variables is described in this 
section. 
4.2.1 The debt covenant variable 
Almost all positive accounting research has used the debt-to-
equity ratio as a surrogate for a firm's closeness to debt covenant 
violations and concluded that the higher the debt-to-equity ratio, the 
more income-increasing accounting methods managers choose. This ratio 
has been the subject of criticism, primarily because the validity of the 
debt-to-equity ratio as a proxy for the closeness of firms to debt 
covenant restrictions and/or violations, has not been established. To 
address the above criticism, Duke and Hunt [1990] studied the ability of 
the debt-to-equity ratio to explain the closeness of firms to debt 
covenant restrictions. Results of their study suggest that for most 
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restrictions (over 60%) which relate to retained earnings, working 
capital, and net tangible assets, the debt-to-equity ratio is a good 
surrogate for the closeness to and/or existence of debt covenant 
restrictions (p. 56). 
Also, the ratio may have an additional dimension that has been 
mostly ignored in previous studies. A company with a high degree of 
debt-to-equity ratio relative to other companies in its industry is more 
likely to have problems in obtaining debt financing in the market than a 
similar firm with a lower ratio (everything else being equal). 
Consequently, a firm with a higher debt-to-equity ratio, is more likely 
to choose income-increasing accounting procedures than a similar firm 
with a lower ratio even though it may not be close to the debt covenant 
restrictions. The distance of the firm's debt-to-equity ratio from that 
of the average of companies in its industry may also result in 
incentives for choices of income-increasing methods. 
Consequently, two sets of variables are used to capture the effect 
of the debt covenants on the accounting method choices: the change in 
the firm's debt-to-equity ratio and the distance between the firm's 
debt-to-equity ratio and that of the industry average (starting with two 
years before the change in accounting procedures). Thus the variable 
(DEBT) represents two sets of variables that are calculated as follows: 
Set One: change in the debt-to-equity ratio 
llliere DE1 is the debt- to-equity ratio for t i 
(i = t, t-1, and t-2). 
Set Two: the distance between the firm's debt-to-equity 
ratio and the industry average debt-to-equity ratio 
Where IDE1 is the industry average of debt-to-equity 
ratio (for i- t, t-1, and t-2) 8 . 
4.2.2 The management compensation variable 
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Three sets of variables are used to capture the effect of the 
manager's compensation on the choices of accounting methods. These sets 
are described below: 
Set One: compensation-plan related variables: 
The values for upper and lower limits in the plans are 
determined by the compensation plan conditions. The 
following are possible situations: 
a) The plan contains upper and lower limits 
b) The plan contains only an upper limit 
c) The plan contains only a lower limit 
d) The plan has no condition for upper and lower 
limits 
e) There is no compensation plan. 
Upper (UPL) and lower (LWL) limits are assigned the 
following amounts (the letters correspond to the above 
situations): 
Upper limit (UPL) Lower limit (LWL) 
a) As reflected in the plan As reflected in the 
b) As reflected in the plan 0 
c) Very large number As reflected in the 
d) Very large number 0 
e) Very large number 0 
The final step to calculate values for upper and lower 
limits is as follows (UL and LL are the independent 
variables used in the model): 
plan 
plan 
8 Firms with the same three digit industry SIC code (as reflected 
in Compustat) are assumed to belong to the same industry. 
UL [UPL - (Nit - At)] 
LL [LWL - (Nit - At)] 
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Where: UL and LL are closeness of upper and lower 
limit values to net income for the period 
[without manipulation in accounting numbers (Nit 
- ~)]. If net income is defined differently in 
the plan, Nit is adjusted to that of the plan. 
To calculate UL and LL, the net income without manipulation in 
accounting numbers is used since the manager's decisions related to 
manipulation of accounting numbers is based on net income before 
manipulation. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, the value for UL 
cannot be obtained using the information in the Proxy statements. As a 
result, this variable was deleted from the model and analysis 9 • 
Set Two: the manager's salary: 
Where: SAL1 is the total CEO's compensation for the 
period (as reflected in the Proxy statements) 
for i-t, t-1, and t-2. 
Set Three: the manager's percentage share in the company's stocks 
(SHARE). Also, the changes in the management share for the 
periods t, t-1, and t-2 are included in the model. 
The variables in Set Three are proposed here because Jensen and 
Meckling [1976] demonstrate that the degree of risk transfer to 
debtholders depends directly on the manager's share in the company. In 
the context of this study, the higher the manager's share in the firm, 
9 The value of LL was obtained for 62 companies, which represents 
319 missing variables for other companies. For more details about the 
sample selection see Chapter Five. 
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the more incentive he/she has in transferring the risk to debtholders 
using income-increasing accounting methods. 
DeAngelo [1988] shows that new managers of companies who won their 
way in a proxy contest, choose to take a "bath" to decrease the earnings 
and blame it on the previous management. To capture any possible effect 
of the changes in management on the choices of accounting methods, the 
following set of variables is included in the model: 
Set Four: Change in the company's CEO (CCE01 ) 
Where: CCE01 is a change in the company's CEO for i (i = t-
2, t-1, and t). CCE01 is a dummy variable which takes 
a value of one if the CEO changes in period of i. 
The symbol MANGMT is used to represent the above-described 
variables (LL, DSAL1 , CCE01 , and SHARE). 
Including the above variables for the effect of the manager's 
compensation (in cases of DSAL1 and LL) and his political influence in 
the firm (in cases of SHARE and CCE01 ) on the accounting method choices 
results in avoiding the related right-hand-side omitted variable 
problem, while representing a more comprehensive description of the 
manager's incentives in hisjher choices of accounting methods. For 
example, no previous study has considered the degree of closeness of 
lower limits (of compensation plans) to the firm's income in explaining 
accounting method choices. 
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4.2.3 The political variable 
Four variables will be used to capture the effect of political 
pressures on the choices of accounting methods. These variables are as 
follow: 
1) The variability in accounting numbers 
2) The size of the company 
3) The market share of the firm (monopoly power) 
4) "Bad" news (as reflected in the Wall Street Journal) which 
includes the following: 
a) Labor union problems 
b) Being subject to regulation 
d) Law suits 
e) Requests for special treatment from the government (e.g. 
subsidies) 
Risk (variability in accounting numbers), size, and monopoly power 
are also assessed as "bad" news for firms. "Bad" is defined as news 
that exposes the firm to political costs. The related values for the 
above four categories are calculated as follow: 
RISK the variance in accounting earnings using ten 
periods of accounting earnings 
SIZE the company's total assets 
MONOP (the firm's total revenue at t-1)/(the total revenue 
of the industry to which the firm belongs at t=l) 10 
NEWS = total number of bad news items from t-1 to t, as 
reflected in the Wall Street Journal. 
Since there is no existing theory of how the above variables 
should be included in a model constructed for explaining choices of 
accounting methods, these variables are used for the test of the theory 
10 The related industry's total revenue is the revenue of companies 
that share the same three-digit SIC code with the firm. 
in two different ways: 
a) Each of the four variables are included in the model 
separately. 
b) An aggregate measure for political pressures is included in the 
model (all four variables will be combined and shown as one 
variable). 
To calculate the aggregate value in (b) above, MONOP, SIZE, and 
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RISK values are divided into five categories according to their values. 
The lowest value (reflecting the least degree of bad news) was assigned 
the number one and the largest value (reflecting the greatest degree of 
bad news) was assigned the number five and those values in between were 
given two, three, and four. The assigned numbers for each company were 
then aggregated and considered as the bad news number resulting from the 
firm's risk, size, monopoly power, and the number of bad news items. 
Then the following index was constructed: 
INDEX - MONOP + SIZE + RISK + NEWS 
It is plausible to expect that dissimilar bad news (political 
pressures) may influence accounting numbers differently. In this study, 
however, it was assumed that such items equally affect the choices of 
accounting methods. To remove this assumption, the researcher would 
need to find a practical method to measure the effect of each item of 
bad news on the accounting method choices. However, presently no such 
method is available and the effects of political pressure on accounting 
method choices is hardly known. 
Methods suggested in this study extend the research to include 
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variables that have generally been ignored in prior research. Moreover, 
this study avoids including only the size of companies as a proxy for 
the political variable, which has been the subject of criticism. 
4.2.4 The omitted variables 
The following variables, which have generally been overlooked in 
previous positive accounting studies, are included in this study: 
a) The firm's financial distress 
b) The firm's subjection to take-over efforts 
Firms with financial distress are those firms that are known to 
have financial problems which may result in future reorganizations 
and/or bankruptcies. Theoretically, these firms lean toward income-
increasing choices of accounting methods to avoid the costs of 
reorganizations and bankruptcies. As suggested in Section 3.4, parties 
who have implicit contracts with the firm, have limited incentives to 
become well-informed about a firm's reputation or financial position as 
it is reflected in the market. These parties may use accounting numbers 
as a low-cost monitoring device to assess the probability of default on 
implicit contracts. Then, those financial distress measures that use 
reported accounting numbers (e.g., Z scores--see below) may be used as a 
proxy for the probability of default on implicit contracts. 
Altman [1983] uses the financial information of the prior year 
(t-1) to estimate the degree of financial distress (named Z scores) for 
the subsequent year. However, here the Z scores are calculated for t-2, 
t-1, and t. This enables the model to capture the possible effect on 
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the accounting numbers of previous (and the anticipated future) periods 
of financial distress. Schwartz [1982] shows that firms_with financial 
problems choose income-increasing accounting methods in both the year of 
bankruptcy and the year before. So, it is possible that a firm, in 
anticipation of future financial problems, may change its accounting 
policies at t. Altman's model is as follows: 
Z1 == .717 X11 + .847 X12 + 3.107 X13 + .420 X14 + .998 X1s 
Where: 
X11 (current assets - current liabilities)/total 
assets 
X12 retained earnings/total assets 
xi3 (earnings before interest and taxes)jtotal 
assets 
X14 (the book value of preferred and common 
stock)/(book value of total liabilities) 
X1s sales/total assets 
for i - t, t-1, and t-2 
He found that firms with Z values greater than 2.9 fit the non-
bankrupt group, while firms with Z values less than 1.2 belonged to the 
bankrupt group. Firms with Z values between 1.2 and 2.9 belonged to a 
gray area for which no decision about the firms' bankruptcy position 
could be made. For the purpose of this study, the Z1 value for each 
firm is calculated and then 1.2 is subtracted from the calculated amount 
to predict a firm's closeness to reorganization and bankruptcy (here 
financial distress). The smaller the computed value (DISTRS 1 = Z1 -
1.2), the closer the firm is to financial distress and the more the firm 
is motivated to choose income-increasing accounting methods. 
Since the coefficients of Z scores were calculated using late 
1970's financial information, the validity of these coefficients, when 
so 
used for late 1980's financial information, can be questioned. For this 
reason, in addition to the Z values, the ZETA® values as calculated by 
Zeta Services, Inc. for periods t-2, t-1, and t, are also included in 
the model. The model to calculate ZETA® values is not publicly 
available and the related values are obtained by soliciting them from 
Zeta Services, Inc .. Although ZETA® values have essentially the same 
use as the Z values, they are presumably a better estimate of financial 
distress since Zeta Services, Inc. updates its models every year. 
Another possible measure of financial distress can be the firm's bond 
rating by the market. Consequently, in addition, to Z and ZETA® values, 
the change in the bond rating of each firm (as reflected in the 
COMPUSTAT) for the three periods (t-2, t-1, t) is employed as another 
measure of financial distress. 
A firm may be subjected to take-over efforts by outsiders. In 
this case, in order to avoid the take-over, the firm's manager may try 
to choose income-increasing accounting methods to signal that the firm 
is in a good financial position. Previous research has shown that 
managers of targeted firms choose more income-increasing accounting 
methods (Groff and Wright (1989]). As a consequence, the presence of a 
take-over effort may have explanatory power in choices of accounting 
methods. A dummy variable (T) is used to capture the possible 
explanatory power of take-over efforts. The presence of take-over 
efforts, which is detected through the Wall Street Journ.?l, results in a 
value of one for the dummy variable, the absence, in a zero value for 
the variable. 
These two variables (DISTRS and T) are the "omitted variables" 
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that have been considered in this study and are shown as OMIT in the 
model. Other omitted variables that are suggested by the critics of 
positive accounting theory (e.g., stock option plans) are not considered 
in this study. The main reason for omitting other variables is that 
methods are not yet known to estimate them. 
4.2.5 The interaction between and among variables 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.4, the omission of the possible 
explanatory power of interaction between and among explanatory variables 
may result in model mis-specification. No specific directions for the 
interactive variables are suggested, unless the variables, involved in 
the interaction have the same income-decreasing (or -increasing) 
expected directions. In that case, the direction of the interactive 
variable will be the same as the directions of the individual variables. 
To facilitate the presentation of the interactive variables, they will 
be shown as INTERACTS in the model. 
4.3 Test of the theory 
The following models can be derived for At: 
At a0 + a 1 (DEBT) + a2 (MANGMT) + a3 (POLITC) + a 4 (0MIT) 
+ ~INTERACTS + e 
At is the total amount of manipulation in accounting numbers 
for period t and the dependent variable. 
DEBT represents two sets of variables as follows: 
CDE1 DE1 - DE1 _1 
DE 1 is the debt to equity ratio for t=i (i=t, t-l,and 
t-2) 
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DDE1 IDE1 - DE 1 
IDE1 is the average debt-to-equity ratio for the 
firm's related industry (fori- t,t-l,and t-2). 
MANGMT represents four sets of variables as follows: 
LL - (LWL - (Nit - Ae)] 
LL is closeness of lower limit value to net income for 
the period [without manipulation in accounting 
numbers (Nit -At)]. If net income is defined 
differently in the plan, Nit is adjusted to that 
of the plan. LWL is assigned values as 
described in section 5.2.2. 
SHARE 
- (SAL1 - SAL1_1 ) 
is the total management revenue (as reflected 
in the Proxy statements) for i-t, t-1, and t-2. 
is the manager's percentage share in the 
company's stocks and changes in his share for 
t-2, t-1, and t. 
is change in the company's CEO for i (i = t-2, 
t-1, and t). CCE01 is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of one if the CEO changes in 
period i. 
POLITC represents either the following four variables: 
RISK 
SIZE 
MONOP 
NEWS -
the variance in accounting earnings. 
= the company's total assets. 
(the firm's total revenue at t)/(the total 
revenue of the industry in which the firm 
belongs at t) 
total number of bad news items from t-1 to t. 
or the following index: 
INDEX = MONOP + SIZE + RISK + NEWS 
NEWS is as defined above and MONOP, SIZE, and 
RISK are as defined above but adjusted as 
described in section 5.2.3. 
OMIT represents two variables, DISTRS 1 and T: 
DISTRS 1 is: 
DISTRS 1 = Z1 - 1.2, (for i~ t and t-1) and Z is 
calculated using the following formula: 
and: 
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Z1 = . 717 X11 + . 847 X12 + 3.107 X13 + .420 X14 
+ . 998 X15 
where;X11 (current assets - current 
liabilities)/total assets 
X12 retained earnings/total assets 
xi3 (earnings before interest and 
taxes)/total assets 
xi4 (the book value of preferred and 
common stock)/(book value of total 
liabilities) 
xi5 - sales/total assets 
for i = t, t-1, t-2. 
DISTRS 1 - ZETA1 for i- t, t-1, t-2. 
where, ZETA® is a risk evaluation score from a 
model developed by Zeta Services Inc. 
DISTRS 1 - BOND-RATING1_1 - BOND-RATING1 
for i = t, t-1, t-2. 
T takes a value of one if the firm is the subject of a 
take-over effort; otherwise its value is zero. 
INTERACTS is the interaction between or among independent 
variables. 
The suggested direction for each of the above independent 
variables is as shown in Tables 6-13 and 6-14. 
The following hypothesis (stated in alternative form) will be used 
to operationalize the hypothesis suggested for the test of positive 
accounting theory in Section 3.5: 
Ha: The coefficients of variables DDE1 , CDE1 , DISTRS 1 , 
DSAL1 , CCE0 1 (fori= t, t-1, and t-2), T, 
SHARE, LL, RISK, SIZE, MONOP, NEWS, and INDEX 
are equal to zero. 
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Since the number of independent variables is relatively sizable, 
and most probably not all independent variables contribute significantly 
to the choices of accounting policies, a step-wise regression analysis 
is applied in this study. The step-wise regression model enables the 
researcher to find the independent variables that significantly 
contribute in explaining the variation observed in the dependent 
variable at a pre-specified level of significance. For the purpose of 
this study the level is set for 0.1500. Also, to avoid problems with 
differences between large and small firms (as mentioned in Section 
2.3.2), the sample is divided into sub-samples of large and small firms. 
The methodology suggested in this study has improved the 
measurement of both the dependent and independent variables. One would 
expect that improvement in the variables would result in an improvement 
in the power of the test .. This not only confirms Watts and Zimmerman's 
[1990] judgment that the weak results observed in prior studies are 
caused by deficiencies in the variables used, but it also demonstrates 
how and to what extent each improvement increases the power of the test. 
The sample and data collection information is presented in the following 
chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
All companies that met the following criteria were considered as 
candidates for the sample of this study: 
1) The company is included in the 1989 Compustat data set. 
2) Ten years of accounting earnings numbers (from 1980 to 1989) 
for the company are available on the Compustat data set. 
3) The company's fiscal year ends on December 31. 
This search resulted in 998 companies. Table 5-l contains the 
information collected for each company. Further, 465 companies (46.5% 
of the useable population) were randomly selected from the total sample 
of 998 available companies. With this reduction in the number of 
companies in the sample, additional data collection became more 
manageable while the necessary number of observations was provided for 
meaningful statistical inferences. 
For the remaining companies, complete Proxy Statements for years 
1987, 1988, and 1989 were collected from the LEXIS library. The search 
in proxy statements was conducted to collect information related to the 
lower and upper bounds of management compensation plans, the CEO's total 
share in the company and compensation for each year, and the changes in 
CEO position during the period of 1986 to 1989. At least one proxy 
statement was found for 408 companies (57 missing items) of the sample 
to allow checking for the presence of the defined bonus plan. 
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TABLE 5-l 
INFORMATION COLLECTED FROM COMPUSTAT 
DATA IN COMPUSTAT DATA ADDRESS COLLECTED FOR YEARS 
TOTAL LIABILITIES ( 6,2) 1986-1989 
COMPANY NAME ----- -----
DNUM ----- -----
CNUM ----- -----
TOTAL EQUITY ( 41,2) 1986-1989 
PRE-TAX INCOME (170,1) 1980-1989 
CURRENT ASSETS ( 4,1) 1987-1989 
CURRENT LIABILITIES ( 5,1) 1987-1989 
RETAINED EARNINGS ( 36,1) 1987-1989 
TOTAL ASSETS ( 6,1) 1987-1989 
INTEREST INCOME ( 62,1) 1987-1989 
NET SALES ( 12,1) 1987-1990 
PRIOR SERVICE COSTS (122,2) 1987-1989 
DEPRECIATION AND ( 14,1) 1988 & 1989 
AMORTIZATION 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (151,1) 1988-1990 
NET OPERATING CASH FLOW (133,2) 1988 & 1989 
ACCRUED INCOME TAX (130,2) 1988 & 1989 
NUMBER OF COMMON STOCKS ( 25,1) 1989 
S&P BOND RATING (105,2) 1986-1989 
Some information could not be collected using the LEXIS library 
(specially the CEO's total compensation for 1986). As a result, search 
for additional and missing information was conducted in DISCLOSURE data 
sets for 1986 to 1989. The following companies were dropped from the 
sample for the reasons mentioned: 
# of companies 
11 
3 
Reason for deletion 
No information was found for the company in 
proxy statements or disclosure data sets. 
Manager in the company is not an individual 
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3 The company had a merger in 1989. The financial 
information is not comparable. 
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The above steps resulted in 448 companies that remained in the 
sample. The sample was further restricted to only manufacturing firms. 
Appendix C reports the SIC code of the industries that were deleted from 
the sample. As a result, a total of 381 companies remained in the 
sample which is the subject of the analysis shown in the next chapter. 
The Wall Street Journal Index was used for the number of "Bad 
News" items issued during the year ending December 31, 1989. The news 
that was considered "Bad News" is indicated in Table S-2 below. 
TABLE 5-2 
NEWS THAT WAS CONSIDERED "BAD NEWS" 
BAD NEWS DESCRIPTION 
a) News about further regulation for the company. 
b) News about the reduction of the firm's market share. 
c) News related to employee layoffs and labor safety violations. 
d) News about the firm's being the subject of environmental concerns. 
e) News about the sales of the company's stocks owned by the company's top management. 
f) News of restructuring (or reorganization) of the company. 
g) Bad news related to the quarterly profits. 
h) News related to the company's selling its units or subsidiaries (e.g., for problems 
observed in the sold units). 
i) News of sudden firing or reassignments of the CEO, top-level Executives, and/or the 
Board of Directors. 
j) News about discontinuation of an operation and/or subsidiary in the firm. 
k) News of labor problems (e.g., strikes and union talks). 
l) News suggesting present or future law suits against the company (e.g., when 
resulting in the company's court involvement). 
m) Bad forecasts for the company's future income. 
n) News about deficiencies in the firm's products. 
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Since the formula for the Zeta8 values is not available publicly, 
Zeta8 values were solicited from Zeta8 Services, Inc. Fortunately, 
Zeta8 Services, Inc. agreed to provide the Zeta8 values and these values 
were added to the data base. A summary of the number of companies 
remaining in the sample is provided in Table 5-3 below. 
TABLE 5-3 
SUMMARY OF THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES REMAINING IN THE SAMPLE. 
Useable number of companies in the_population 
Random deletion of companies 
Deletion of Service-related industry companies 
Total number of companies for which 
the data was collected 
Further adjustment for: 
Mergers 
Non-availability of data 
CEO not being an individual 
Total companies in the sample1 
3 
11 
_l 
998 
(533) 
.£j]j_ 
398 
il1.l 
381 
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1 However, data was not available for all the variables for all 381 companies remaining in the 
sample. For example, LL was obtained for only 62 companies, which results in 319 missing 
values for this explanatory variable. SAS® deletes from analysis any observation for which any 
datum is missing. As a result, the number of companies included in each model (as discussed in 
Chapter 6) depends on the number of companies that do not have any missing values for the 
variables that are included in the model. 
After the companies that remained in the sample were chosen, the 
financial statements of all the companies in the sample for the year 
ending December 31, 1989, were searched for the public announcement of 
the net effect that changes in accounting methods had on 1989's net 
income. The NAARS data base was used for this search and the search 
code was the company name and "CHANGE W/7 EFFECT W/10 NET INCOME." The 
amount of the effect resulting from the change in accounting methods 
that was found with the above procedure was finally added to the total 
amount of manipulation in accruals that was calculated according to the 
model described in Section 4.1. The following chapter presents the 
results of this study. 
CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
As was mentioned in Chapter Four, the following are the research 
methodology issues that are addressed in this study: 
a) Dependent (left-hand-side) variable problems. 
b) Sample selection problems. 
c) Explanatory (right-hand-side) variables problems. 
d) Model mis-specification problems. 
e) Omitted variables problems. 
The model for this study, described in Chapter Four, was designed 
in such a way that each of the above problems could be addressed 
separately. The following sections point out the results observed 
relating to these issues. 
6.1 Dependent (left-hand-side) variable problems 
The problem of mis-measurement of the dependent variable is 
mentioned in Section 2.3.1. The model used in this study (MAC model) 
not only separated the amount of discretionary and non-discretionary 
accruals, but also allowed the researcher to measure the manipulated 
part of the discretionary accruals. There exists in the literature only 
one other model that has tried to predict the amount of the accruals: 
DeAngelo [1986 & 1988] used a random walk model to predict the expected 
amount of accruals. 
60 
61 
Consequently, DeAngelo's model was the only previous model with a 
dependent variable to which the results of this study could be compared 
(regressions that have used the MAC model compared to regressions that 
have used DeAngelo's dependent variable model). The same test 
conditions and independent-variables were used for the dependent 
variable in both models, and the best regression models for each were 
found using step-wise regression analysis. 
The degree of fit for both models is compared in Panel A of Table 
6-1. Furthermore, the firms in the sample were divided into two groups, 
large and small companies11 , and the same comparisons were made (Panels 
B and C in Table 6-1) 12 . 
As Table 6-1 shows, the degrees of fit in regressions (R2 ) show 
that the MAC model outperforms the other model13 • When some of the 
interactions between and among the independent variables were included 
as explanatory variables in the step-wise regression analysis, the 
results changed to those of Table 6-2. 
·
11 To divide the sample into large and small, the highest and the 
lowest amounts of the total assets were found for the firms in the 
sample. The average of the two was then considered as the bench-mark 
(the average was $623 million). Those firms that have total assets 
larger than the bench-mark were assigned to the LARGE group and others 
were assigned to the SMALL group. 
12 The largest number of firms included in the step-wise regression 
analysis is 201 firms. Although the total number of firms for the 
sample is 381, missing variables results in the deletion of some firms 
from the analysis. 
13 The results remained the same even when the MAC model was 
regressed on the best independent variables for the random walk model--
R2 remained higher even though the independent variables were the same. 
TABLE 6-1 
A COMPARISON OF THE R2 AND ADJUSTED R2 FOR TWO MODELS NOT 
INCLUDING INTERACTIONS AMONG AND 
BETWEEN. INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Results using the MAC model 
Panel A: Model includes In' • 6 
management ··= 43 
All compensation Ry = .67 
observa- lower limit Adjusted R2 • .61 
tions variable 
are 
included Model without In • 7 
management n • 201 
compensation R2 • .43 
lower limit Adjusted R2 • .41 
variable 
Panel B: Model includes In • 4 
management 
Ry: 35 Only compensation .62 
large lower limit Adjusted R2 • .57 
companies variable 
are 
included Model without In = 8 
management Ry: 
117 
compensation .47 
lower limit Adjusted R2 • .43 
variable 
Panel C: Model includes The model does not provide 
management meaningful statistical 
Only compensation inferences. The number of 
small lower limit observations was only eight. 
companies variable 
are 
included Model without In • 10 
management n• 84 
compensation R2 • .83 
lower limit Adjusted R2 • .81 
·variable 
* In the number of independent variables in the model. 
** n = the number of observations. 
Results using the random 
walk model 
In "' 7 
Ry: 43 
.50 
Adjusted R2 = .40 
In • 4 
n = 204 
R2 • .23 
Adjusted R2 = .22 
In ,. 4 
R-q: 35 
.38 
Adjusted R2 = .30 
Iri • 4 
n'"' 117 
R2 • .25 
Adjusted R2 • .23 
The model does not provide 
meaningful statistical 
inferences. The number of 
observations was only eight. 
In = 8 
n = 87 
R2 = 
.54 
Adjusted R2 = .50 
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Panel A: 
All 
observa-
tions 
are 
included 
Panel B: 
Only 
large 
companies 
are 
included 
Panel C: 
Only 
small 
companies 
are 
included 
TABLE 6-2 
A COMPARISON OF THE R2 AND ADJUSTED R2 FOR TWO MODELS 
INCLUDING INTERACTIONS AMONG AND BETWEEN 
VARIABLES 14 
" 
olr• n•lna rh• R•n lt"• 
'"i"" •en~~-
valk model 
Model includes lt&:- 4 In • 4 
management n • 43 R-q: 
43 
compensation lover R2 • .66 .45 
limit variable AdJusted R2 • .62 Adjusted R2 • .39 
Model vithout In • 14 In·• 17 
management 
R-q: 
201 
R-q: 
204 
compensation .74 .70 
lover limit Adjusted R2 • .72 Adjusted R2 • .67 
variable 
Model includes In • 3 In • 3 
management 
R-q: 
35 
R-q: 
35 
compensation lover .63 .40 
limit variable Adjusted R2 • .60 Adjusted R2 • .34 
Model vithout In •· 11 In • 17 
management 
R-q: 
117 
R-q: 
117 
compensation .72 .72 
lover limit Adjusted R2 • .69 Adjusted R2 = .67 
variable 
Model includes The model does not provide The model does not provide 
management meaningful statistical meaningful statistical 
compensation lover inferences. The number of inferences. The number of 
limit variable observations vas only eight. observations vas only eight. 
Model vithout In • 12 In • 12 
management 
Ry: 
84 n • 87 
compensation .88 R2 • .67 
lover limit Adjusted R2 • .86 Adjusted R2 • .61 
variable 
* In • the number of independent variables in the model. 
** n • the number of observations. 
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14 Results of the random walk model in Panels A and B (for models 
that include the management compensation lower limit) are adjusted to 
facilitate comparison between the two models. Without adjustment, the 
numbers of independent variables in the model were 10 and 8 (with 
adjusted R2 of .92 and .89 for sample sizes of 43 and 35 observations) 
for Panels A and B respectively. 
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As one can easily observe, degrees of fit (stated in R2 and 
adjusted R2 ) for the MAC model remained higher than those of the random 
walk model. This demonstrates that when the measurement problems 
associated with the dependent variable are reduced, the degree of fit 
(R2 ) for the choices of accounting policies improves15 . On the other 
hand, the values for R2 (and adjusted R2 ) are higher when interactive 
variables are included in the model. This implies that the improvement 
in the degree of fit results not only from the improvement in the 
explanatory variable but also from that in the independent variables. 
The discussion related to the explanatory variables problems follows in 
the next section. 
6.2 Explanatory (right-hand-side) variables problems 
Tables 6-3 and 6-4 illustrate the coefficients of the independent 
variables that remained in the models using step-wise regression 
analysis criteria. Different models were obtained depending on the 
number of independent variables and the number of observations available 
for the step-wise analysis. 
Table 6-3 illustrates models in which no interactive variables 
were allowed. To estimate the best model for the test of the theory, 
all the independent variables that were introduced in Section 4.3 (also 
shown in Table 6-7 below) were included in the step-wise regression 
analysis. 
15Notice that the best fit models are predicted using the "step-
wise regression methods." As a result, the R2s shown in Tables 6-1 and 
6-2 are the highest possible R2s that can be obtained for the 
independent variables whose significant contribution level is at least 
at the level of 0.1500. 
TABLE 6-3 
BEST REGRESSION MODELS WHEN ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, 
AND NO INTERACTIVE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, ARE 
INCLUDED IN THE STEP-WISE 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Panel A. Estimated Model for "ALL" Companies. 
~- .6661 
Adjusted R • .6089 
Number of observations: 43 
t-Statistic 
Parameter * Estimate HO: Parameter • 0 
Intercept 
I19 
I2 
I7 
I26 
I16 
-32.759916 -0.330 
-71.497202 -2.052 
-229.10501 -2.732 
-0.470840 -2.791 
-98.072078 -1.861 
-0.000123 -2.222 
Panel B. Estimated Model for "LARGE" Companies. 
~2 - .6180 
Adjusted R • .5671 
Number of observations: 35 
t-Statistic 
Parameter * Estimate HO: Parameter • 0 
Intercept 
Il9 
I2 
I7 
I26 
IlO 
72.049525 
-115.17026 
-345.30970 
-0.269686 
-114.38787 
180.360074 
0.639 
-4.090 
-4.479 
-1.769 
-1.733 
1.704 
Panel C. Estimated Model for "SMALL" Companies. 
Prob > I T I 
0.7431 
0. 0477a 
0. 0098a 
o. oo85: 
0.0712 
o .0329a 
Prob > I T I 
0.5276 
0. 0003a 
0. 0001: 
0.0870b 
0.0933b 
0.0973 
No meaningful statistical inferences can be drawn; there are only eight 
observations available for the model. 
a Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
b Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
* See Table 6-7 pages 76 ' 77 for the description of the independent variables. 
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To facilitate the discussion of the results, "ALL," "LARGE," and 
"SMALL" will be used as abbreviations for models constructed using 
sample firms of all, large, and small companies. Following are the 
models for "ALL" and "LARGE" companies: 
Model one; ALL: 
At • -32.76 -71.50(!19) -229.11(!2) -0.47(!7) -98.07(!26) -.0001(!16) 
prob > ITI (0.047) (0.010) (0.008) (0.071) (0.032) 
Model two; LARGE: 
At • +72.05 -115.17(!19) -345.31(!2) -0.27(!7) -114.39(!26) +180.36(!10) 
prob > ITI (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.093) (0.097) 
Interestingly enough, Il9 (bad news) and Il6 (risk) as 
representatives of the Political hypothesis, I2 (change in debt-to-
equity ratio) as representative of the Debt hypothesis, and I7 
(closeness of management compensation plan's lower limit to net income) 
and IlO (change in management total compensation) as representatives of 
the Management compensation hypothesis, and finally, Il6 (change in z® 
values) as representative of one of the Omitted variables are included 
in the above models. Then, the following can be suggested from the 
above discussion: 
A - a0 + a1 (DEBT) + a2 (MANGMT) + a3 (POLITC) + a4 (OMIT) 
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which is exactly the general model suggested in the research design in 
Section 4.3. 
Since one could criticize the results of the above models because 
the number of observations (43 and 35) seems to be insufficient for the 
inferences drawn, the models were tested by increasing the sample size. 
The most frequently missing variable (the closeness of the lower limit 
of the manager's bonus plan to the net income--17) was deleted as an 
independent variable. Results of regressions without 17 are presented 
in Table 6-4. 
As one can notice in Table 6-4, deleting 17 as one of the 
independent variables results in a substantial increase in the number of 
observations (from 43 to 201 in Panel A, from 35 to 118 in Panel B, and 
from 8 to 83 in Panel C). The increase in the number of observations in 
Panel C provides the opportunity to draw meaningful inferences for the 
sample of smaller firms. The following are the models for ALL, LARGE, 
and SMALL companies: 
Model three; ALL: 
A1 • +29.90 -60.30(!19) -0.01(!17) +272.04(!10) +18.69(!21) -253.89(!29) 
prob > ITI (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.012) 
+285.14(!9) -49.58(!24) 
(0.036) (0.114) 
Model four; LARGE: 
At • +71.22 -61.56(!19) -0.01(!17) +275.05(!10) +31.79(!21) -452.60(!29) 
prob > ITI (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) 
+432.39(!9) -166.68(!25) -25.09(!6) 
(0.035) (0.029) (0.120) 
TABLE 6-4 
BEST REGRESSION MODELS YHEN ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
(EXCEPT THE LOWER LIMIT BOUNDARY OF THE MANAGEMENT 
BONUS PLAN) AND NO INTERACTIVE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES ARE INCLUDED IN THE STEP-WISE 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Panel A. Estimated Model for "ALL" Companies. 
~- .4269 
Adjusted R • .4061 
Number of observations: 201 
t-Statistic 
Parameter * Estimate HO: Parameter • 0 Prob > I T I 
Intercept 
!19 
!17 
!10 
I21 
I29 
I9 
I24 
+29.902829 
-60.299886 
-0.011978 
+272.03816 
+18.686296 
-253.88751 
+285.14044 
-49.582656 
+0.723 
-3.906 
-6.055 
+4.939 
+2.745 
-2.539 
+2.109 
-1.588 
Panel B. Estimated Model for "LARGE" Companies. 
R2 • .4660 
Adjusted R2 • .4265 
Number of observations: 117 
Parameter * Estimate 
Intercept +71.225224 
!19 -61.557142 
!17 -0.010635 
!10 +275.04747 
I21 +31.787653 
I29 -452.59986 
I25 -166.67754 
I9 +432.39579 
I6 -25.088113 
HO! Parameter • 
+0.913 
-2.869 
-4.163 
+3.737 
+3.007 
-2.955 
-2.212 
+2.130 
-1.568 
Panel C. Estimated Model for "SMALL" Companies. 
R2 • .8303 
Adjusted R2 • .8064 
Number of observations: 84 
Parameter * Estimate 
Intercept +3. 411385 
I3 -2.339632 
I26 -1.787599 
I24 -11.106567 
I6 +0.937865 
I21 +1.952585 
I110 +71.574470 
!14 -15.527726 
I27 +1.309766 
!111 +46.421299 
I23 +8.704381 
HO: Parameter • 
+1. 650 
-6.576 
-1.623 
-3.468 
+2.257 
+4.362 
+3.207 
-2.999 
+1.471 
+2.307 
+2.374 
a Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
t-Statistic 
0.4708 
0.00013 
0.00013 
0.0001a 
0.0066a 
0.0119a 
0.0362a 
0.1139 
0 Prob > I T I 
t-Statistic 
0 Prob 
0.3631 
0. 0050a 
0.0001a 
0. 0003a 
0. 00333 
0. 0038a 
0. 0290a 
0.03543 
0.1199 
> I T I 
0.1035 
0.00013 
0.1091 
0. 0009a 
0.0271a 
0. 0001 a 
0.00203 
0. 00373 
0.1456 
0. 0240a 
0. 0203a 
* See Table 6-7 pages 76 ' 77 for the description of the independent variables. 
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Model fivei SMALL: 
A1 • +3.41 -2.34(!3) -1.79(!26) +71.57(!110) +1.95(!21) -15.53(!14) +1.31(!27) 
prob > lrl (0.000) (0.110) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.150) 
+46.42(!111) +8.70(I23) -11.11(!24) +0.94(I6) 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.000) (0.027) 
The variables included in the above models can be summarized as 
follows 16 : 
1) Those related to Political hypothesis: 117, and 119 
2) Those related to Debt hypothesis: 13, and 16 
3) Those related to Management interest (e.g., compensation) hypothesis: 
18, 19, 110, 114, 1110, and Illl 
4) Those related to Omitted variables: 121, 123, 124, 12?, 126, 127, and 
129 
Again, the following general model (which was suggested in Section 
4.3) can be observed: 
A - a 0 + a1 (DEBT) + a2 (MANGMT) + a3 (POLITC) + a4 (OMIT) 
Comparing the results in Tables 6-3 and 6-4 provides another very 
interesting observation17 • A comparison of the R2 and adjusted R2 in 
Tables 6-3 and 6-4 shows that the degrees of fit (adjusted R2 ) are 
reduced when 17 is deleted as an explanatory variable (e.g., from 0.61 
to 0.41 for the sample of "ALL" companies). The fact that the only 
16 For a more detailed discussion of variables included in the 
models of SMALL, LARGE, and ALL see Section 6.4 below. 
17 Table 6-4 also shows that the degrees of fit increase when the 
sample is divided into two groups "LARGE" and "SMALL." Not only does 
this confirm the conclusion drawn in Section 6.4 below, but also this 
can suggest that the variance in the dependent variable which is not 
explained (by the size of the company) may have resulted from the 
differences among the industries and other specific characteristics that 
separate individual firms from other firms within an industry. 
difference between the variables in the models for Table 6-3 and Table 
6-4 is the absence of the independent variable 17 suggests that the 
presence of the management compensation plan details has a noticeable 
effect on explaining the choices of accounting policies. This 
conclusion confirms that of Healy [1985]. 
6.3 Model mis-specification problems 
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The two model mis-specification problems that were mentioned in 
Section 2.3.4 were related to the underlying assumption regarding 
managers' choices of accounting methods and to treating explanatory 
variables as additive and ignoring the possible interactions (Watts and 
Zimmerman [1990]). 
This study and its results do not suggest any alternative for the 
underlying assumption about managers' choices of accounting methods. To 
avoid the criticism of model mis-specification related to ignoring 
interactive variables, some interactive variables were included in the 
model (see Table 6-8 for a detailed list of these variables). Since one 
could have considered a large number of interactive variables, three 
criteria were used to limit the number finally included in the models 
and thus to avoid unnecessary complexity in the interpretation of the 
results. 
First, the interactions of variables that had not significantly 
contributed to the choices of accounting policies (using the results of 
models without interactions) were assumed to be insignificant and were 
deleted (e.g., those interactions that may share Il were deleted--see 
Table 6-7 pages 76 & 77). Second, interactions were limited to those 
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that had a logical basis for a possible effect on the choices of 
accounting policies (e.g., those of "management compensation" and 
"political pressures"). And third, interactions among the variables 
were limited to a maximum of three-member interactions. 
The same modeling procedures used for Section 6.2 above were 
employed with the interactive variables. Results of this process are 
shown in Tables 6-5 and 6-6. 
Interestingly enough, the R2 improved in all the models, 
indicating that the interactions between and among independent variables 
improve the degree of fit. This argument suggests that Watts and 
Zimmerman's claim that the mis-specification problem resulted from the 
missing interactions is a valid claim. The following are the models for 
ALL and LARGE companies: 
Model six; ALL: 
At= -13.49 +233.83(IN1) -219.69(!2) +77.16(!4) -1284.82(IN7) 
prob > ITI (0.000) (0.002) (0.033) (0.118) 
Model seven; LARGE: 
At s -71.34 +230.88(IN1) -194.68(!2) +86.52(!4) 
prob > ITI (0.000) (0.014) (0.046) 
TABLE 6-5 
BEST REGRESSION MODELS WHEN ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
AND INTERACTIVE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE INCLUDED 
IN THE STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Panel A. Estimated Model for "ALL" companies. 
~ - .6576 
Adjusted R • .6215 
Number of observations: 43 
t-Statistic 
Parameter * Estimate HO: Parameter • 0 
Intercept 
IN1 
I2 
I4 
IN7 
-13.493370 
+233.833504 
-219.697489 
+77.159557 
-1284.82172 
-0.190 
+5.587 
-3.296 
+2.213 
-1.601 
Panel B. Estimated Model for "LARGE" Companies. 
R2 • .6348 
Adjusted R2 • .5995 
Number of observations: 35 
t-Statistic 
Parameter * Estimate HO: Parameter • 0 
Intercept 
IN1 
I2 
I4 
-71.340899 
+230.881384 
-194.681459 
+86.519324 
-0.856 
+4.859 
-2.611 
+2.078 
Panel C. Estimated Model for "SMALL" Companies. 
Prob > I T I 
0.8502 
0.0001a 
0.002la 
0.0330a 
0.1177 
Prob > I T I 
0.3988 
0.0001a 
0. 0138a 
0.0461a 
No meaningful statistical inferences can be drawn; there are only eight 
observations available for the model. 
a Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
* ~ee Tables 6-7 and 6-8 pages 76-78 for the description of the independent variables. 
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TABLE 6-6 
BEST REGRESSION MODELS WHEN ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (EXCEPT 
THE LOWER LIMIT BOUNDARY OF THE MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION PLAN) 
AND INTERACTIVE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE INCLUDED 
IN THE STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Panel A. Estimated Model for "ALL" companies. 
~2 - . 7381 
Adjusted R • .7184 · 
Number of observations: 201 
t-Statistic 
Parameter * Estimate HO: Parameter • 0 Prob > I T I 
Intercept +12.884259 +0.560 
IN1 +176.839823 +5.359 
IN12 -0.002803 -10.48 
119 ·-34. 524552 -3.233 
IN17 +0.004907 +8.040 
IN18 -0.037031 -3.208 
IN13 +0.013200 +8.105 
IN4 +0.000362 +2.425 
118 -393.361950 -3.553 
IN5 +1023.49565 +4.624 
I26 -30.109710 -2.356 
I21 -15.575593 -2.626 
IN2 -39.809579 -1.781 
IS -201.197498 -2.078 
I9 +149.367281 +1.543 
Panel B. Estimated Model for "LARGE" Companies. 
~- .7184 
Adjusted R • .6889 
Number of observations: 117 
t-Statistic 
Parameter * Estimate !fO: Parameter • 0 
Intercept +17.767214 +0.375 
IN1 +149.017628 +3.997 
IN20 -4193.74455 -8.031 
IN9 +7457.75055 +6.118 
119 -36.262307 -2.303 
IN18 -o. oo1124 -8.450 
IN13 +0.010642 +7.660 
IN2 +13.462418 +2.437 
IN7 -1708.39383 -3.442 
118 -472.315068 -2.836 
IN5 +1026.60398 +3.479 
I21 -18.968804 -1.946 
Panel C. Estimated Model for "SMALL" Companies. 
~ - .8776 
Adjusted R • .8566 
Number of observations: 84 
t-Statistic 
Prob 
Parameter * Estimate HO: Parameter • 0 Prob > 
Intercept +3.271689 +1. 775 
I3 -3.757964 -13.84 
IN16 +0.023669 +7.194 
I24 -14.528099 -6.925 
116 -0.001868 -3.793 
I23 +12.779247 +5.606 
114 -8.4940481 -1.774 
Il11 +41.547813 +2.479 
IN1 +38.134937 +2.067 
127 +1.289850 +1.704 
119 -3.611846 -2.183 
IllO +30.262469 +1.901 
IN3 +0.053855 +1.659 
a Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
b Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
0.5764 
0.0001a 
0.0001a 
0. 0014a 
0.0001a 
0.0028a 
0.0001a 
0. 0163a 
o.ooo5a 
0.0001a 
0.0195a 
0. 0094~ 
0.0766 
0.0391a 
0.1240 
> I T I 
0.7088 
0.0001a 
0.0001a 
0.0001a 
0. 0233a 
0.0001a 
0. 0001 a 
0. 0165a 
o.ooosa 
0. 0055a 
0.0007~ 
0.0543 
I T I 
0.0802 
0.0001a 
0.0001a 
0.0001a 
0. 0003a 
0. 0001~ 
0.0805 
0. 0156a 
0.0424a 
0.0927b 
0. 0324a 
0. 0615b 
0.1015 
* See Tables 6-7 and 6-8 pages 76-78 for the description of the independent variables. 
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The variables included in the above models can be summarized as 
1) Those related to Political hypothesis: 119 (INl = 119·* 18) 
2) Those related to Debt hypothesis: 12, and 14 
3) Those related to Management compensation hypothesis: 18, and 110 
4) Those relate-d to Omitted variables: 129 (IN7 - 129 * 18) 
Again, the following general model (as suggested in Section 4.3) 
can be observed: 
A = a0 + a1 (DEBT) + a2 (MANGMT) + a3 (POLITC) + a 4 (OMIT) 
When compared to models one and two in Section 6.2, the above two 
models display other interesting results. First, although the number of 
independent variables that have significantly contributed to the choices 
of accounting policies has decreased, the degree of fit (R2 ) has 
increased. Second, the variable related to the "lower limit of the 
management's bonus plan" is not present. Since step-wise regression 
analysis was used to estimate the best model (using Prob = 0.15 as the 
cut-off point), this may suggest that the interactive variables can be 
capturing the details of the underlying covenants --including the bonus 
details. 
To test this supposition, the same regressions without the 
presence of the lower limit as an explanatory variable were run. The 
results of the regressions are displayed in Table 6-6. Interestingly 
enough, not only did the degree of fit not decrease, but it increased 
18 For a more detailed discussion of variables included in the 
models of LARGE, and ALL see Section 6.4 below. 
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(e.g., change in adjusted R2 from 0.62 to 0. 72 for "ALL"). Since the 
number of independent variables in the models reflected in Table 6-6 is 
relatively large, the independent variables in each model of Table 6-6 
are not shown in model formats, as other models were. However, the 
information necessary to construct each model is present in the Table. 
Another interesting point observable in Table 6-6 is that the 
value of the adjusted R2 has again improved after dividing the sample 
into two groups, large and small companies. This is similar to the 
results that will be discussed in Section 6.4 below. One may conclude 
that managers of small firms choose accounting methods differently from 
managers of large firms. 
One interactive variable is present in all models shown in Tables 
6-5 and 6-6. The variable is INl, which is the interaction of the 
management total compensation (the difference between years 1989 and 
1988, to be precise) and the number of Bad News items for 1989 as 
published by the Wall Street Journal. This variable represents an 
interaction between the management and political pressures, which is one 
of the interactions that is suggested by Watts and Zimmerman [1990]. 
Tables 6-7 and 6-8 below provide detailed information about all 
explanatory variables (and their interactions) that were included in 
step-wise regression analyses. The predicted signs for independent 
variables are drawn from the predicted signs for contracting parties (as 
described in Table 3-1) after necessary adjustment for the measurement 
methods used for calculating each of the independent variables. 
Vari-
able 
Il 
I2 
I3 
I4 
I5 
I6 
I7 
IS 
I9 
!10 
Ill 
. !12 
I13 
!14 
!15 
!16 
!17 
!18 
I19 
!20 
!21 
I22 
!23 
TABLE 6-7 
DESCRIPTION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INCLUDED 
IN STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Predicted Observed 
sign sign Description of the independent variable 
(*) (N) DE. - DE._ ; where DE is the total debt to total equity ratio. 
(*) (-) DEt-' - DEt_?; where DE is the total debt to total equity ratio. 
(*) (-) DE1_2 - DE1_3 ; where DE is the total debt to total equity ratio. 
(*) (M) IDE1 - DE1 ; where IDE is the firm's industry debt to equity 
(+) ratio average. 
(*) (N) IDE1_1 
- DEt-1; where IDE is the firm's industry debt to equity 
ratio average. 
(*) (**) IDE1_2 - DEt-3: where IDE is the firm's industry debt to equity 
ratio average. 
The closeness of lower limit values of the management compensation 
(-) (-) plans to the income (as defined in the plan) for the period. 
(*) (M) SAL1 - SALt_ 1 ; where SAL is the total management revenue. 
(+) 
(*) (+) SALt_ - SALt-?1 where SAL is the total management revenue. 
(*) (+) SALt-? - SAL._,; where SAL is the total management revenue. 
(*) (M) The manager's percentage share in the company's stocks. 
(-) 
(+) (M) 
- 1, if the CEO is changed in 1989. 
(+) 
(*) (N) 
- 1, if the CEO is changed in 1988. 
(*) (-) 
- 1, if the CEO is changed in 1987. 
(*) (M) 
- 1, if the CEO is changed in 1986. 
(+) 
(-) (-) The variance in accounting earnings for the period of 1980-1989. 
(-) (-) The firm's total asset. 
(-) (M) The ration of the firm's total revenue in 1989 to the total 
(-) revenue of the firm's related industry. This variable measures 
the company's market share. 
(-) (-) Total number of bad news items from t-1 to t. 
(-) (-) Change in the firm's bond rating from t-1 to t. 
(-) (+) Change in the firm's bond rating from t-2 to t-1. 
(-) (N) Change in the firm's bond rating from t-3 to t-2. 
(-) (+) Degree of DISTRS stated as Z value at t. 
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TABLE 6-7 (Continued) 
!24 (-) (-) Degree of DISTRS stated as z value at t-1. 
I25 (-) (**) Degree of DISTRS stated as z value at t-2. 
I26 (-) (-) Change in Zeta• value of the f1rm from t-1 to t. 
I27 (-) (+) Change in Zeta• value of the firm from t-2 to t-1. 
!28 (-) (N) Change in Zeta• value of the fLrm from t-3 to t-2. 
I29 (+) (-) - 1 if the firm was the subject of a take over in 1989. 
IllO (+) (+) CEO's share change in the firm from t-1 to t. 
Illl (+) (**) CEO's share change in the firm from t-2 to t-1. 
Note: subscripts t, t-1, t-2, and t-3 stand for years 1989, 1988, 1987, and 1986 respective
ly. 
"I" • "independent variable." The number following "I" represents the number allocated t
o that 
specific independent variable. 
(*) • The sign of the coefficient cannot be predicted. 
(**) • Different signs were observed for the coefficient in different models. 
(N) • The variable was not statistically significant enough to be included in any of the models 
tested throughout the study. 
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(M) • The variable Ls not statistically significant enough to be included in the prlmary models of 
the study; however, the sign of the variables can be abstracted from other models (see 
Section 6.6 below). 
vari-
able 
INl 
IN2 
IN3 
IN4 
INS 
IN6 
IN7 
INS 
IN9 
INlO 
IN11 
IN12 
IN13 
IN14 
IN15 
IN16 
IN17 
INlS 
IN19 
IN20 
TABLE 6-8 
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERACTIONS AMONG AND BETWEEN 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES INCLUDED IN 
STEP-WISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Predicted Observed Description of the independent variable 
sign sign 
(*) (+) Interaction between Il9 and IS. 
(*) (**) Interaction between Il9 and IlO. 
(*) (M) & (+) Interaction between Il7 and IlO. 
(*) (+) Interaction between Il6 and IlO. 
(*) (**) Interaction between IlS and IlO. 
(*) (N) Interaction between Il6 and IS. 
(*) (-) Interaction between I29 and IlO. 
(-) (M) & (-) Interaction between I21 and IlO. 
' 
(+) (**) Interaction between I29 and IS. 
(*) (M) & (-) Interaction between I24 and IlO. 
(*) (N) Interaction between Il6 and I21. 
(*) (-) Interaction between Il6 and I29. 
(*) (+) Interaction between Il7 and I21. 
(*) (M) & (+) Interaction between Il9 and I21. 
(*) (N) Interaction between Il9 and I29. 
(*) (**) Interaction among Il6, I21, and IS. 
(*) (**) Interaction among I16, I29, and IS. 
(*) (-) Interaction among I17, I21, and IlO. 
(*) (M) & (-) Interaction among I19, I21, and IlO. 
(*) (-) Interaction among I19, I29, and IS. 
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Note: subscripts t, t-1, t-2, and t-3 stand for years 1989, 1988, 19S7, and 1986 respectively. For 
definitions of independent variables, see Table 6-7 pages 76 & 77. 
"IN" • "interactive independent variable.• The number following "IN" represents the number 
allocated to that specific interactive independent variable. 
(*) • The sign of the coefficient cannot be predicted. 
(**) • Different signs exist for the coefficient in different models. 
(N) • The variable was not statistically significant enough to be included in any of the models 
tested throughout the study. 
(M) • The variable is not statistically significant enough to be included in the primary models of 
the study; however, the sign of the variables can be abstracted from other models (see 
Section 6.6 below). 
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6.4 Sample selection problems 
Two problems were mentioned in Section 2.3.2 about the sample 
selection for previous studies. One problem is related to the 
generalizeability of results when the sample in these studies was not 
chosen from the general population of firms. This problem has been 
avoided here since the only limitations for the sample selection are 
related to useability and availability of the data for the companies 
included in the sample~ 
The second problem is related to observed differences between 
large and small companies. Although previous studies have shown that 
large and small companies have chosen different accounting methods (see 
Section 2.3.2), studies of the positive accounting theory do not 
partition the sample into large and small companies. To avoid this 
problem, the sample of this study is divided into two groups: large and 
small companies. As one can observe in Tables 6-1 and 6-2, the sample 
in this study is analyzed in the following forms: 
1) All companies and all variables are included in the analysis. 
2) All companies and all variables, except the lower limit of the 
management compensation plan, are included in the analysis. 
3) All companies, all variables, and some interactive variables are 
included in the analysis. 
4) All companies, all variables (except the lower limit of the 
management compensation plan), and some interactive variables are 
included in the analysis. 
After the sample was divided into large and small companies, the 
above analyses were performed for large and small groups. Since only 8 
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observations were available for small companies for the first and third 
analyses above, those analyses were deleted for small companies. As a 
result, for ALL, LARGE, and SMALL companies four, four, and two analyses 
were performed respectively. Tables 6-9 to 6-12 compare the results of 
"ALL" and "LARGE" analyses. 
TABLE 6-9 
COMPARISON OF "ALL" AND "LARGE" FIRMS WHEN 
ALL (EXCEPT NO INTERACTIVE) VARIABLES 
ARE INCLUDED IN THE MODEL 
ALL LARGE 
VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 
!19 .3360 !19 .3260 
I2 .1978 I2 .2042 
I7 .0520 I7 .0496 
I26 .0297 I26 
.:..91..l!l 
!16 .0232 
I!O .0280 
R :6'66'7 R2 .6181 
* See Table 6-7 pages 76 ' 77 for the description of 
the independent variables. 
TABLE 6-10 
COMPARISON OF "ALL" AND "LARGE" FIRMS 
WHEN ALL (AND INTERACTIVE) VARIABLES 
ARE INCLUDED IN THE MODEL 
ALL LARGE 
VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 
IN1 .4969 IN1 .4945 
I2 .0914 I2 .0895 
I4 .0463 I4 .0508 
IN7 .223: 
R2 
.6576 R2 .6348 
* See :ables 6-7 and 6-8 pages 76-78 for the description 
of the independent variables. 
TABLE 6-11 
COMPARISON OF "ALL" AND "LARGE" FIRMS 
WHEN ALL (EXCEPT I7 AND INTERACTIVE) 
VARIABLES ARE INCLUDED IN 
THE MODEL 
ALL LARGE 
VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 
I19 .2358 I19 .2249 
IlO .0708 I17 .0670 
I17 .0655 IlO .0666 
I21 .0207 I21 .0276 
!29 .0144 !25 .0243 
!9 .0122 !29 .0220 
!24 .0075 !9 .0214 
R2 
.4269 I~ R .0122 -:4660 
* See Table 6-7 pages 76 ' 77 for the description of 
the independent variables. 
TABLE 6-12 
COMPARISON OF "ALL" ·AND "LARGE" FIRMS 
WHEN ALL (EXCEPT I 7) AND INTERACTIVE 
VARIABLES ARE INCLUDED IN 
THE MODEL 
ALL LARGE 
VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 
IN1 .2490 IN1 .2514 
IN12 .1354 IN20 .1273 
Il9 .0884 IN9 .0785 
IN17 .0872 !19 .0740 
IN18 .0447 IN18 .0451 
IN13 .0381 IN13 .0402 
IN4 . 0377 IN2 .0314 
Il8 .0184 IN7 .0288 
IN5 .0118 Il8 .0181 
I26 .0080 IN5 .0132 
!21 .0077 !21 ..:..2.l.Q£ 
IN2 .0043 
IS .0041 
I? .0034 R T38I R2 . 7184 
* See Tables 6-7 and 6-8 pages 76-78 for the description 
of the independent variables. 
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The comparison of "ALL" and "LARGE" in Tables 6-9 to 6-12 shows 
that although the sample of "LARGE" is a sub-sample of "ALL," the 
explanatory variables that were included in both models (by the step-
wise regression analysis) are very similar. For example, those 
explanatory variables that contribute the largest partial R2 in Tables 
6-9 and 6-10 are the same. Also, a comparison of R2s for "ALL" and 
"LARGE" reveals that the explanatory powers of the models are very 
close. The following shows the comparison: 
TABLE # ALL LARGE 
6-9 .6667 .6181 
6-10 .6576 .6348 
6-11 .4269 .4660 
6-12 .7381 . 7184 
Interestingly enough, the results do not hold when the comparison 
is made between the "LARGE" and "SMALL" or "ALL" and "SMALL." Since 
the models for "LARGE" and "SMALL" are different (as will be discussed 
in more detail, shortly), this suggests that the results of "ALL" are 
mainly driven by the "LARGE" companies. Because the models for "ALL" 
and "LARGE" are basically the same, the comparisons between models of 
"ALL" and "SMALL" is not necessary; the comparison between models for 
"LARGE" and "SMALL" (as discussed below) will be applicable to "ALL" and 
"SMALL. II 
Tables 6-13 and 6-14 compare the explanatory variables that are 
included in models for "SMALL" and "LARGE." 
TABLE 6-13 
COMPARISON OF "LARGE" AND "SMALL" WHEN ALL 
(EXCEPT I7 AND INTERACTIVE) VARIABLES 
ARE INCLUDED IN THE MODEL 
Il9 
117 
IlO 
121 
125 
129 
19 
16 
LARGE 
.2249 
.0670 
.0666 
.0276 
.0243 
.0220 
.0214 
.:.,Qlli 
.4660 
VARIABLE' 
13 
!26 
16 
124 
121 
1110 
Il4 
127 
!23 
IP1 
R 
SMALL 
PARTIAL R2 
.5974 
.0718 
.0390 
.0303 
.0233 
.0183 
.0150 
.0131 
.0129 
.0073 
-:am 
* See Table 6-7 pages 76 ' 77 for the description of 
the independent variables. 
TABLE 6-14 
COMPARISON OF "LARGE AND "SMALL" WHEN ALL 
(EXCEPT I7) AND INTERACTIVE VARIABLES 
ARE INCLUDED IN THE MODEL 
LARGE SMALL 
VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 VARIABLE' PARTIAL R2 
IN1 .2514 13 .6036 
IN20 .1273 IN16 .0917 
IN9 .0785 123 .0688 
!19 . 0740 I24 .0351 
IN18 .0451 Il6 .0340 
1N13 .0402 127 .0077 
IN2 .0314 Il4 .0075 
IN7 .0288 Il9 .0070 
Il8 .0181 Illl .0068 
IN5 .0132 INl .0060 
121 ~ IN3 .0048 
rpo .0045 
R2 
.7184 R :am 
* See Tables 6-7 and 6-8 pages 76-78 for ~he descrip~ion 
of the independent variables. 
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As expected, large and small firms' decisions of accounting 
methods are based on different motives. Il9 (bad news) has the largest 
partial R2 for "LARGE." Its partial R2 is 0.2249 and (part of) 0.2514 
in Tables 6-13 and 6-14 respectively19 • On the other hand, I3 (change 
in the debt-to-equity ratio from 1986 to 1987) has the largest partial 
R2 for "SMALL." Its contribution in Tables 6-13 and 6-14 is 0.5974 and 
.6036, respectively. Interestingly enough, Il9 (bad news) does not 
influence the choices of accounting policies in "SMALL" and I3 (change 
in the debt-to-equity ratio from 1986 to 1987) does not influence the 
choices of accounting policies in "LARGE." 
One other observation in Table 6-14 is the difference between the 
number of interactive and non-interactive explanatory variables which 
are included in models of LARGE and SMALL. Among the first eight 
variables included in the model for LARGE (which explain 67.67% of 
variation observed in the dependent variable), there is only one non-
interactive variable (Il9--bad news). However, among the first eight 
variables included in the model for SMALL (which explain 85.54% of 
variation observed in the dependent variable), there is only one 
interactive variable (IN16--interaction among variables related to debt, 
financial-distress, and management compensation). This suggests that 
interactions between and among explanatory variables have more 
explanatory power for larger firms than for smaller firms. 
Following is a more comprehensive comparison of the independent 
19 Note that "INl" is the interaction between "Il9" and "18." So, 
part of the partial R2 explained in "1Nl" (0.2514) results from the 
presence of "18" in the interactive variable. "18" is the change in the 
manager's salary from 1988 to 1989. 
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variables that are included for models "LARGE" and "SMALL" in Table 6-
13: 
Debt variables: 16 I3 & 16 
Manager compensation: r9 & no 
Manager's political power: - 114, 1110, & Illl 
Political pressure: n9, !17, & 129 
Financial distress: 121 & 125 123, 124, 126, & 127 
The interpretation of the results for "LARGE" and "SMALL," in 
Table 6-14, was more objective when the components of the interactive 
variables20 , rather than the interactive variables themselves, were 
used. Variables that showed a very small contribution in R2 (as 
reflected in the partial R2 ) were then deleted from the set of 
explanatory variables. The following variables remained for "LARGE" and 
"SMALL." 
2° Following are the components of the interactive variables that 
are shown in Table 6-14: 
1Nl 119 ~" 18 1N2 !19 * no IN3 117 * 110 INS 
- 118 * no 
1N7 129 
'" 
110 1N9 129 * 18 
1Nl3 117 -k 121 1Nl6 116* 121 * 18 
' 1Nl8 117 * 121 ~~ no, 1N20 = 119* 129 * 18 
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Debt variables: I3 
Manager compensation: IS & no IS 
Manager's political power:- 114, IllO, & Illl 
Political pressure: Il7, !18, 119, & I29 116 
Financial distress: I21, I23, I24, & I27 
The following interesting results can be drawn from the above 
comparisons: 
1) Debt-related, Manager's political power, and Financial 
distress variables are the main variables being considered 
by managers of smaller firms when they make their decisions 
about accounting policies. 
2) Manager-compensation related and political pressure 
variables are the main variables being considered by 
managers of large companies when they make their decisions 
about accounting policies. 
The fact that debt-related and financial distress variables play a 
more significant role in accounting-methods choices of smaller firms 
may suggest that these firms have a more limited access to the financial 
market and/or that the debt covenants play a more restrictive role for 
them. It is logical to assume that the larger firms' requests (to 
debtholders) for additional financing are more acceptable than those of 
the smaller firms, since larger firms are likely stronger and more 
stable. 
Another interesting difference between independent variables for 
the models of small and large firms can be observed in the management-
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related variables. Managers of smaller firms consider effects of 
accounting methods on their political power while managers of larger 
firms appraise effects of accounting methods on their total 
compensation. One may suggest that this difference in behavior results 
from differences in the ability of managers of small and large firms to 
obtain political power in their companies. 
Since the net worth (equity) of smaller firms is, obviously, 
smaller than that of larger firms, it is easier for managers of smaller 
firms to increase their political power (e.g., by investing in their 
firms' stocks--the large number of outstanding common stocks in larger 
firms requires considerable amount of investment for obtaining political 
power). Since managers of larger firms can not easily obtain political 
power in their firms, it is logical that they are more concerned about 
their total compensation than their political power. 
Finally, managers of larger firms are more concerned about outside 
political pressures. As one expects, the larger a firm is, the more 
closely it is inspected by outsiders and the more news is disclosed 
about the firm's performance. As a result, managers of larger firms 
apparently consider political pressures more seriously than their 
counterparts in smaller firms. Results of this study confirm that 
political pressures affect accounting-method choices in larger firms 
more than they do in smaller firms. 
The above results demonstrate that managers of small and large 
firms use different sets of variables to make decisions for accounting 
methods. This suggests that the low explanatory power observed in 
previous studies of positive accounting theory might have resulted 
partially from ignoring the differences between large and small firms. 
The following section discusses results of the study for the omitted 
variables problems. 
6.5 Omitted variables problems 
The following independent variables that have for the most part 
been ignored (omitted variables) in the previous positive-accounting-
theory literature were included in models for this study to test their 
effects on accounting method choices: 
a) Zeta® values for years 1989, 1988, 1987, and 1986 (126-128). 
b) Z values for years 1989, 1988, and 1987 (123-125). 
c) The company's bond rating for years 1989, 1988, 1987, and 1986 
(120-122). 
d) Bad News as reflected in the Wall Street Journal (119). 
e) Firms' subjection to take-over efforts (129--a dummy variable). 
f) Existence of long-term compensation plans (a dummy variable). 
g) Upper limit of management compensation plans. 
h) Lower limit of management compensation plans (17). 
i) The management share in the company for years 1989, 1988, and 
1987 (Ill, !110, and !111). 
j) Monopoly power (or market share) of the company (118). 
The variables "upper limit of management compensation plans" and 
the "existence of long-term compensation plans" were excluded from the 
analysis because the data were available in Proxy statements for only 
three firms and because almost all firms in the sample had a long-term 
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bonus plan. 
All other variables were included in models for the test of the 
theory, and several show that they affect the managers' accounting 
policy choices. The most remarkable effects could be seen from the 
variables that measure degree of financial distress (Zeta8 , Z, and Bond 
rating) and political pressure (Bad News). Also, the "firm's subjection 
to take-over efforts" contributes to the income-increasing choices of 
accounting policies (see Table 6-7 pages 76 & 77). 
The above results support Watts and Zimmerman's [1990] claim about 
the effect of missing variables. When the above variables are included 
in models of this study, degrees of fit (R2 ) increase. 
6.6 Other issues 
One of the problems in using regression analysis occurs when some 
of the independent variables are highly correlated among each other. 
This could be called either intercorrelation or multicollinearity, the 
latter term applying to a perfect or near-perfect relationship. As a 
result, any single independent variable can be dropped; others are 
closely enough related to overcome the loss. This study does not 
suggest any solution for the intercorrelation or multicollinearity 
problem; however, the study is designed in such a way that variables 
with high degrees of correlation cannot be included (or accepted) in 
models at the same time. 
If one variable--for example "A"--is highly correlated with 
another variable--for example "B"--and if it contributes more than any 
other variable in the variation of the dependent variable, that variable 
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("A") will be chosen for the model. The other variable (i.e. "B") cannot 
be included in the model since the part of the variation of the 
dependent variable that could have been explained by this variable (i.e. 
"B"), has already been explained by the first variable (i.e. "A"). A 
review of the intercorrelation of the variables remaining in the models 
after step-wise regression analysis proves this point. 21 
Another question was whether different methods for measuring some 
of the independent variables would improve the results of the analysis. 
For example, Section 5.3 suggests two measures for political variables. 
One measure includes politically-related variables without any 
adjustments to their values, and the other measure is a construction of 
a political INDEX. The suggested INDEX was constructed and all tests 
addressed previously were redone. The results of the regression (when 
compared in R2 ) did not improve and in some cases weakened. Also, some 
of the independent variables (I7, I8, I9, IlO--see Table 6-7 pages 76 & 
77 for explanations) and the dependent variable were normalized by 
dividing them by the firm's total assets. Again, the results of the 
regressions did not show an improvement in R2 . Using step-wise 
regression analysis, however, different independent variables were 
included in the model. Some of the observed signs shown in Tables 6-7 
and 6-8 were obtained from the new models (see items marked "M" in 
Tables 6-7 and 6-8). 
As one may find in Tables 6-7 and 6-8, the observed signs of some 
independent variables were opposite to those predicted. These variables 
21 There are very few independent variables that still indicate a 
high degree (above 0.5) of correlation between each other. 
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are: 
1) Change in the firm's bond rating from t-2 to t-1, 121. 
2) Degree of financial distress for t, stated as Z value, 123. 
3) Change in Zeta® value of the firm from t-2 to t-1, 127. 
4) Firm's subjection to take-over efforts, 129. 
It is interesting to see that the time frame is similar for two of 
these variables (t-2 to t-1); they are all changes in the independent 
variable from 1987 to 1988. The observed sign for the first two 
variables is (+)whereas the predicted sign was (-). The results 
suggest that the decrease in bond rating and Zeta® value (both 
indicating a more financially distressed situation), do affect the 
accounting method choices in the opposite of expected direction after 
two years. 
Further study is needed to determine the effects of changes in the 
firm's management and financial distress signals. The following chapter 
presents the summary, contributions and limitations, and suggestions for 
further research. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, 
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study was to address the "power-of-test" 
issues that Watts and Zimmerman [1990) considered as reasons for the 
lack of strong support for positive accounting theory. The "power-of-
test" issues were related to the dependent (left-hand-side) variable, 
the sample selection, explanatory (right-hand-side) variables, model 
mis-specification, and omitted (missing) variables. 
The methodology of this paper has improved the methodology of most 
previous studies of positive accounting theory in the following 
respects: 
1) It outlines a model of accruals and shows how it controls for the 
non-discretionary part of accruals. Some accounting decisions 
that affect accruals have been made earlier and are probably 
beyond the managers' discretion at the time of the measurement. 
So, the amount of accruals should be adjusted for non- · 
discretionary items. 
2) It suggests refined variables for the effects of debt covenants 
and management compensation on the choices of accounting methods. 
For example, the introduction of the closeness of the firm's debt-
to-equity ratio to that of its industry as a whole as an 
explanatory variable is one such item. 
3) It introduces a more comprehensive measure of political pressures 
and their effects on the choices of accounting procedures. Most 
studies have simply used "size" of a company as a proxy for the 
political contracts effects. 
92 
4) It considers the interaction between and among some explanatory 
variables. Previously the explanatory variables were considered 
additive only and interaction effects were ignored. 
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5) It includes lag variables that capture the effect of prior period 
changes in independent variables on the choices of accounting 
methods. 
6) It separates the sample into two sub-samples: large and small 
companies. Results provided evidence that managers of small and 
large firms have different incentives in their accounting-method 
decision processes. 
The results of this study suggest that when the measurement of the 
dependent (left-hand-side) variable is improved, powers-of-test (stated 
in degrees of fit) improve. Also, the analysis of the results shows 
that improving the measurement of the independent (left-hand-side) 
variables and including variables that have theoretical justification 
for being included in models explaining accounting method choices but 
have previously been missing, improve the power-of-test. When 
interaction between and among some of the independent variables was 
incorporated in the models, the power-of-test also improved. The models 
found by the step-wise regression analysis support the general model 
suggested by the positive accounting theory. 
Results of this study support Watts and Zimmerman's claims that 
the weak explanatory power found in previous studies can be attributed 
to research methods and not to a deficiency in the theory of positive 
accounting. Therefore, the results of this study provide a significant 
contribution to the accounting choice literature. 
As any other study, this one is subject to limitations. To 
construct the models in this study, two sets of assumptions were used 
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as: 
a) Assumptions for the dependent variable 
b) Assumptions for independent variables 
The model for the discretionary amount of accruals was constructed 
by relying on a set of assumptions (mentioned in Section 4.1) that 
resulted in determination of the manipulated amount of income for the 
period in question. For example, the ratio of the non-discretionary 
amount of accruals to the firm's revenue was assumed to be constant from 
one period to the next. Also, it was assumed that the revenue is 
deferred from one period to another, and in the period to which the 
revenue is deferred, no revenue manipulation exists other than that 
which is deferred (a three-period world resulted in the above 
conclusion). 
The assumptions related to the independent variables were mainly 
related to the political and missing variables. For example, it was 
assumed that each "bad news" item affects the manager (in his choices of 
accounting methods) equally. An implicit assumption for omitted 
variables (e.g., firm's set of investment opportunities, set of implicit 
contracts, accepted set of accounting methods) is that they remain 
constant during the test period. However, if the changes in accounting 
methods result solely or partly from omitted variables, the model for 
the test of theory is mis-specified. One extension of this study can be 
the relaxation of some of the above assumptions to find the effect(s) of 
these assumptions on the test results. For example, one can find the 
effects of different "bad news" items on the accounting method choices. 
95 
Another extension of the present study can be to apply the 
methodology introduced in this paper to service industries. This study 
deleted the service industries and only addressed the manufacturing 
industries. Obviously, the manager of a service company can, and has 
incentives to, manipulate accounting numbers. 
One of the most interesting results of this study is that it shows 
that lags of independent variables have explanatory power for in-use 
accounting methods. Previous research of positive accounting theory has 
tried to find the relation between the in-use accounting methods at one 
point in time and values for a series of independent variables at the 
same point in time. The present study demonstrates that not only 
current values of independent variables, but their lag values have 
explanatory power. 
Since in-use accounting methods are also related to the previous 
choices of accounting methods, one can also conclude that to explain and 
predict the choices of accounting policies, the researcher needs to 
consider the previously chosen methods as explanatory variables. 
Including this variable in the test of the theory can be another 
extension of the present study. 
Since a new model for the measurement of the manipulated amount of 
accruals is introduced here, one which outperforms existing models in 
the literature, it can be applied to find the relation between the 
amount of manipulation in the accounting numbers and stock market 
reactions. The results of previous studies have been conflicting and 
further studies in this area are needed. 
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APPENDIX A 
SELECTED STUDIES IN POSITIVE ACCOUNTING LITERATURE 
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AUTHOR(S) DATA 
Hagerman and 300 randomly chos.en 
Zmijews.ki firms on CRSP tape 
(1978) 
DeAngelo 86 proxy contests for 
(1988) board seats from weekly 
bulletins 
Uberty & 190 firms (376 contracts) 
Zimmerman that have had tabor union 
(1986) contract negotiations 
McNichols 106 firms that have 
and Wils,on shown a material accounts 
(1986) receivable balance 
DeAngelo 64 firms whose 
(1986) managementsproposed to 
purchase all publicly-held 
common stock 
Healy (1965) Total of 1527 company-
year, tor years 196<4-80 
Healy and 126 firms who experience 
Palepu (1990) an increase In the 
tightness of tneir 
dividend constraint 
Daley and 313firms (erther 
V1geland capltalizers or expensers 
(1983) of R&D) for 1972 
Zmijewski and 313 firms used in 
Hagerman prellious study (1978) 
(1981) 
Cnen and Lee 23 oil companie• 
(1990) swttchlng to successful 
efforts and 66 non-
swllching oil companies 
METHODOLOGY DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE VARIABLE 
Multivariate test of the problt analysis. Four accounting Size, risk, management profit~ 
method choices sharing plan. concentration ratio, 
cap~al intenstty, effective )ax rate. 
"Random walk model" to analyze the 
-- --
unexpected amount of accruals (t test & 
Wilcoxon signed rank test). 
Earnings Expectation Models (time series and 
-- --
random walk models) and two control groups 
of firms. 
The expected bad-debt expense Is calculated 
-- ---
using OLS regression and Is compared to the 
amount reflected In the financial statements. 
"Aandomawalk model" to analyze the 
-- ---
unexpected portion of accruals (t test & 
Wilcoxon-slgned rank test). 
Changes In the amount of accrualund their 
-- ---
correspondence to the upper and lower 
boundaries of the management compensation 
plans. 
(Univariate regression of) analysis of the Changes In net Closeness to dividend constraint, 
changes In accounting methods and accruals Income and changes In operating cash now 
In correspondence with the changes In the diVIdend paid. and changes In EPS. 
debt-related dividend constraint. 
Univariate and multivariate tests o1 Capitalization of Income. sales. dividend, and 
relationship between debt covenant R&D (Cost) leverage variables. 
constraints and polrtlcal cost variables. and 
R&D accounting methods. 
Univariate model ol relationship between Four accounting Size. risk, management proflt-
accounting~method-strategy and method sharing plan. concentration ratio. 
Independent variables. choices. capttallntensrty, total debl/lotal 
assets. and Industry concentration 
ratio. 
Combinations of financial statements Change• in the Changes resuttlng from the 
analysis, univariate and multivariate management switch and management 
regression tests. co mpensatlon. ownership percentage. Also, size, 
operation volatlltty, business 
concentration, exploration 
lntenstty, leverage. and dividend 
variables. 
Some of the &elected 5tucUe& In the posttlve accounting literature 
RESULTS 
Risk management, profit sharing. risk and capital intensity are 
siQnlficant. 
But. risk and management profit &haring have wrong direction 
(sign). 
Managers would exercise their accounting discretion pre-
contests. (While the real profrtabUtty has not Increased.) II they 
are elected by shareholders, dissidents tend to take an 
immediate earninQs bath. 
The study is unable to document any managerial opportul)istlc 
behavior. 
Ftrms performing unusually well or poorly exert discretion to 
decrease their lncome.(The study has been subject to e><lreme 
criticism. It uses one accrual amount in&tead of the total 
accruals and tt Ignores the managementcompensatJonplans.) 
Managers do not exercise their accounting discretion to 
understate earnings In periods before a management buyout cf 
public shareholders. 
Accrual policies of managers are related to Income-reporting 
incentives of their bonus contracts and changes In accounting 
procedures by managers are associated with adoption or 
modification of their bonus plans. 
H does not appear that firms make accounting changes to 
circumvent the dividend restrl.ctlon. The magnnude of the 
dividend culls proportional to the Ughtness of the dividend 
constraint. 
Firms wlllch capitalized R&D costs were more highly leveraQed, 
used more public debt, were closer to dividend restrictions, .00 
were smaller than firms which expensed R&D costs. 
Size. managementcompensatlon, conc:entration ratio, and the 
total asset ratio, have a significant association with the choice 
of the firms' Income strategy. 
Executives of swllching firms had a bonus plan that was 
strongly tied to reported Income; the assets wrhe down would 
have adversely affected the executive bonus. For the firms that 
opted tor wrtte-down, the executives' bonus was nota!lected 
by the wrne-down of assets. 
I 
..... 
0 
..... 
APPENDIX B 
EXAMPLE FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE CALCULATION 
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The following is a hypothetical situation that has been provided 
for the model introduced in the study. The items are selected in a way 
that correspond to the terminology used in the study. The case has 
three succeeding periods of time ("t-1," "t," and "t+l") and the 
manipulation of accounting numbers has taken place at "t." 
ACCOUNTING NUMBERS WITHOUT MANIPULATION 
"t-1" "t" "t+1" 
Sales (.8 cash) 400 500 300 
Cash ex (.5 sales) (200) (250) (150) 
200 250 150 
Accrued expenses: 
Dep. Ex. 50 50 50 
Bad debt (.1 sales) 40 50 30 
Other accruals (.2 sales) 80 100 GO 
Total accruals (170) (200) (140) 
Net Income 30 50 10 
----
---- ---
Account Receivable(.2 sale) 
80 100 GO 
---
== ---
Assume that the manager manipulates the amount of sales, bad debts 
expense, and the depreciation expense for the period "t." The manager 
may decide to decrease or increase the net income of the period, 
depending on the firm's contracting situation. Also, assume that the 
changes in the depreciation expense are disclosed in the financial 
statements as "cumulative effect of the changes in accounting methods." 
As a result, it is not necessary that the researcher calculate the 
effect of the depreciation manipulation on the period's net income. The 
direction of the manipulation in net income can be predicted by the 
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direction of the "cumulative effect of the changes in accounting 
methods" (or by that of the effect of the manipulation of the variable 
accrued expenses) on net income. The following situation is a case of 
income-increasing behavior for period "t:" 
MANAGER CHOOSES TO INCREASE THE NET INCOME FOR "t:" 
Assume that the result of the manipulation is as follows: 
"t-1" "t" "t+1" 
Sales 350 550 300 
Cash ex {175) {275) {150) 
175 275 150 
Accruals: 
Dep. ex. 50 30 70 
Bad debt 35 27.5 57.5 
Other accruals 70 110 60 
Total accruals {155) {167.5) {187.5) 
---
Net Income 20 107.5 (37.5) 
===== -----
---
-----
Account Receivable 30 100 60 
-- --- ---
The dependent variable for the test of theory consists of three 
components as: 
the fixed accrual effect 
the variable accrual effect 
the revenue deferral effect 
According to the model suggested in the proposal, the following 
steps should be taken to calculate the dependent variable: 
Step one: Find the disclosed amount of Aft: 
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This amount should have been disclosed in the financial statement, 
and for this case, it is assumed that the effect of change in the 
depreciation expense has been disclosed as $20. Then, Aft is "+20." 
Step two: Calculate Rdt (assume ~ and Rt+l are reported revenues for 
the two periods t and t+l and AR stands for accounts receivable): 
ARt+dRt+l ,. Kt+l - K - 60/300 - . 2 
~t- ARt/K = 100/.2- 500- expected revenue for t. 
Rdt (Rt- RTt)(l-b), where b is the total variable cost ratio. 
b = [(275/550) + ((27.5+110)/550)] = .75 
Rdt- (Rt - RTt)(l-b) - (550 - 500)(1-.75) - 12.5 
Step three: Calculate Avt: 
Rvt = Eat - Fat 
where: 
Eat total accrued expenses 
Fat fixed accrued expenses 
Rvt - variable accrued expenses 
Vt_1 - Evct-1 )/Rt-l - ((1SS-S0)/3SO) .3 
vt - Evt I Rt- ((167.S-30)/SSO) .2S 
av = vt-1 - vt 
Avt - !:J.V * Rrt 
Test of calculation 
.3 - .2S- +.OS 
.OS * SOO - 2S 
At Aft + Avt + Rdt 
At 20 + 12.S + 2S - S7.S 
Reported net income - True net income - Manipulated amount 
107.S so S7.S 
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As a consequence, given the assumptions constructed for the model, 
the model can capture 100% of the manipulation for period "·t." 
DeAngelo's 1988 random walk model would result in $27.5 for the 
manipulation in the net income in period t. As is shown, the model of 
this study outperforms the random walk model. 
APPENDIX C 
LIST OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES THAT WERE DELETED 
FROM THE SAMPLE 
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SIC Code Industry Name (by the Compustat) 
700 AGRICULTURAL SERVICES 
1382 OIL AND GAS FIELD EXPL SVCS 
1389 OIL & GAS FIELD SERVICES,NEC 
1400 MNG, QUARRY NONML MINERALS 
2531 PUBLIC BLDG & REL FURNITURE 
2711 NEWSPAPER:PUBG, PUBG & PRINT 
2741 MISCELLANEOUS PUBLISHING 
2750 COMMERCIAL PRINTING 
2761 MANIFOLD BUSINESS FORMS 
2771 GREETING CARDS 
2790 SERVICE INDS FOR PRINT TRADE 
2833 MEDICINAL CHEMS,BOTANICL PDS 
2835 IN VITRO,IN VIVO DIAGNOSTICS 
3470 COATING,ENGRAVING,ALLIED SVC 
3532 MNG,MACHY,EQ, EX OIL FIELD 
3555 PRINTING TRADES MACHY,EQUIP 
3669 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIP,NEC 
3822 AUTOMATIC REGULATING CONTROLS 
3911 JEWELRY,PRECIOUS METAL 
4011 RAILROADS,LINE-HAUL OPERATING 
4100 TRANSIT & PASSENGER TRANS 
4213 TRUCKING, EXCEPT LOCAL 
4220 PUBLIC WAREHOUSING & STORAGE 
4400 WATER TRANSPORTATION 
4412 DEEP SEA FRN TRANS-FREIGHT 
4512 AIR TRANSPORT, SCHEDULED 
4513 AIR COURIER SERVICES 
4522 AIR TRANSPORT, NONSCHEDULED 
4581 AIRPORTS & TERMINAL SERVICES 
4700 TRANSPORTATION SERVICES 
4731 ARRANGE TRANS-FREIGHT, CARGO 
4812 RADIO TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION 
4813 PHONE COMM EX RADIOTELEPHONE 
4822 TELEGRAPH & OTH MESSAGE COMM 
4832 RADIO BROADCASTING STATION 
4833 TELEVISION BROADCAST STATION 
4841 CABLE AND OTHER PAY TV SVCS 
4899 COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES,NEC 
4911 ELECTRIC SERVICES 
4924 NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION 
4932 GAS & OTHER SERV COMBINED 
4941 WATER SUPPLY 
4950 SANITARY SERVICES 
4953 REFUSE SYSTEMS 
4991 CP GENERATN-SM POWER PRODUCER 
5000 DURABLE GOODS-WHOLESALE 
5013 MOTOR VEH SUPLY, NEW PTS-WHSL 
5045 COMPUTERS & SOFTWARE-WHSL 
5050 METALS, MINERALS,EX PETE-WHSL 
5051 METALS SERVICE CENTERS-WHSL 
5065 ELECTRONIC PARTS, EQ-WHSL,NEC 
5070 HARDWR, PLUMB, HEAT EQ-WHSL 
5072 HARDWARE-WHOLESALE 
5084 INDUSTRIAL MACH & EQ-WHSL 
5090 MISC DURABLE GOODS-WHLS 
5140 GROCERIES & RELATED PDS-WHSL 
5172 PETROLEUM,EX BULK STATN-WHSL 
5271 MOBILE HOME DEALERS 
5311 DEPARTMENT STORES 
5399 MISC GENERAL MDSE STORES 
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5400 FOOD STORES 
5411 GROCERY STORES 
5412 CONVENIENCE STORES 
5500 AUTO DEALERS,GAS STATION 
5531 AUTO AND HOME SUPPLY STORES 
5600 APPAREL AND ACCESSORY STORES 
5712 FURNITURE STORES 
5734 CMP & CMP SOFTWARE STORES 
5812 EATING PLACES 
5900 MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL 
5944 JEWELRY STORES 
5945 HOBBY,TOY & GAME SHOPS 
5960 NONSTORE RETAILERS 
5961 CATALOG, MAIL-ORDER HOUSES 
6021 NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS 
6022 STATE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
6029 COMMERCIAL BANKS 
6035 SAVING INSTN,FED CHART 
6036 SAVINGS INSTN, NOT FED CHART 
6111 FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES 
6141 PERSONAL CREDIT INSTN 
6153 SHORT-TERM BUS CREDIT, EX AG 
6159 MISC BUSINESS CREDIT INSTN 
6162 MORTGAGE BANKERS & LOAN CORR 
6163 LOAN BROKERS 
6172 FINANCE LESSORS 
7359 EQUIP RENTAL & LEASING, NEG 
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